TRADEOFFS IN POWER GRID OPERATION DURING A PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF by De Abreu, Andrea L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2020
TRADEOFFS IN POWER GRID OPERATION
DURING A PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF
De Abreu, Andrea L.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66621
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








TRADEOFFS IN POWER GRID OPERATION DURING A 
PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF 
by 
Andrea L. De Abreu 
December 2020 
Thesis Advisor: David L. Alderson Jr. 
Second Reader: Jean Carlson, 
 UC Santa Barbara 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
TRADEOFFS IN POWER GRID OPERATION DURING A PUBLIC SAFETY
POWER SHUTOFF
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Andrea L. De Abreu












11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis considers challenges associated with managing the risk of wildfires caused by electric 
utilities, specifically the use of deliberate, and potentially widespread, power outages termed Public Safety 
Power Shutoff (PSPS) events. A PSPS event is a way to reduce potential liability in utility-associated 
wildfires, but it also creates additional dangers and economic hardships for utility customers.  This thesis 
performs three modeling and analysis tasks: (1) it presents an extensive exploratory data analysis on the 
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) power grid, utility-caused ignitions, and past PSPS events; (2) it develops 
models to gain insight on the PG&E decision process during PSPS events; and (3) using power outage 
studies and economic models, it estimates the social cost of PSPS events. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
wildfires, power operation, public safety power shutoff



















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
TRADEOFFS IN POWER GRID OPERATION DURING A PUBLIC SAFETY 
POWER SHUTOFF 
Andrea L. De Abreu 
Ensign, United States Navy 
BS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2020 
Approved by: David L. Alderson Jr. 
 Advisor 
 Jean Carlson 
 Second Reader 
 W. Matthew Carlyle 
 Chair, Department of Operations Research 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 This thesis considers challenges associated with managing the risk of wildfires 
caused by electric utilities, specifically the use of deliberate, and potentially widespread, 
power outages termed Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events. A PSPS event is a 
way to reduce potential liability in utility-associated wildfires, but it also creates 
additional dangers and economic hardships for utility customers.  This thesis performs 
three modeling and analysis tasks: (1) it presents an extensive exploratory data analysis 
on the Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) power grid, utility-caused ignitions, and past PSPS 
events; (2) it develops models to gain insight on the PG&E decision process during PSPS 
events; and (3) using power outage studies and economic models, it estimates the social 
cost of PSPS events. 
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Executive Summary
Wildfires have become an increasing concern in the Western United States over the last
decade, particularly in California. Years of forest mismanagement, build-up of dry fuels,
and climate change have created conditions ripe for wildfires, sparked naturally or otherwise.
In 2017 and 2018, there were four catastrophic wildfires in Northern California caused by
electric utility operations. These fires have been ranked among the top-20 deadliest wildfires
in the history of California. Utility companies found responsible for the fires faced lawsuits
and bankruptcy, and an increased awareness around utility-caused wildfires led to changes
in regulations and legislation.
As a result of these and other incidents, utility companies are keenly focused on ways of
mitigating the risk and liability of their operations. During periods of extreme risk, electric
utilities have additionally started to stage widespread power outages—termed Public Safety
Power Shutoff (PSPS) events—in an effort to reduce the risk of wildfires. The purpose of
this thesis is to identify and examine tradeoffs in the timing, scope, and duration of PSPS
events.
This thesis performs three modeling and analysis tasks: (1) we conduct an extensive ex-
ploratory data analysis on the Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) power grid, utility-caused
ignitions, and past PSPS events; (2) we developmodels to gain insight on the PG&E decision
process during PSPS events; and (3) using power outage studies and economic models, we
estimate the social cost of PSPS events.
To achieve these objectives, this thesis curates, integrates, and visualizes data from a wide
variety of sources, including PG&E, the California Public Utilities Commission, and the
California Independent System Operator. This allows us to identify interactions between
the electric power grid, terrain, climate, and wildfire risk. We learn that ignition risk varies
widely across the power grid, and that utility-caused ignitions are common and have the
potential to grow into large fires. Additionally, PSPS events can vary largely in scope based
on duration, the number of customers affected, and the lost electric load. Much of the data
we use is part of a yearly effort put out by PG&E in their Wildlife Mitigation Plan; new data
will be available in 2021 that may supplement this analysis and provide more information
xv
on the state of the power grid.
Furthermore, we develop simple regression models to determine important factors in
PG&E’s decision-making process when executing PSPS events. We observe the key drivers
to be whether or not a circuit crosses the High Fire Threat District (and what proportion of
it is within this area) and a PG&E-calculated risk score. Future work would benefit from
having more complete and detailed data for all assets in the power grid to conduct a more
thorough analysis.
Finally, we translate concrete impact measures such as the duration, customers, and lost load
during a power shutoff into the overall social cost of PSPS events. We determine that for past
events, this value ranges from tens of millions to potentially billions of dollars. We estimate
a lower bound for this cost that does not consider the varying electric demand of commercial
and/or industrial customers or customers PG&E classifies as “other” or “medical baseline”.
The next phase in this research should consider a higher level of fidelity in modeling wild-
fires, the electric power grid, and the costs of power outages. This would entail formulating
an optimization problem that explores tradeoffs in the timing, scope, and duration of PSPS
events.
Finally, the results from analyses in this and related studies have implications for Department
of Defense (DOD) operations. Somemilitary installations in the U.S. are exposed to wildfire
risk, and all are vulnerable to power outages. The DOD would greatly benefit from better
understanding the interactions between wildfires and the electric power grid, as well as how
to restore power safely and efficiently.
xvi
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Wildfires have become an increasing concern in the Western United States over the last
decade, particularly in California. Years of forest mismanagement, the build-up of dry fuels,
and climate change have created conditions ripe for wildfires, sparked naturally or otherwise.
This has coincided with increased development at the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI),
defined by the Forest Service as “any area where humans and their development meet or
intermix with wildland fuel” (Stein et al. 2013). The fire risk is heightened during the dry
and windy conditions characteristic of the California wildfire season.
In 2017 and 2018, there were four catastrophic wildfires in Northern California caused by
electric utility operations. These fires — the Camp Fire, Tubbs Fire, Redwood Valley Fire,
and Atlas Fire —- have been ranked among the top-20 deadliest wildfires in the history
of California (CAL FIRE 2019). Utility companies found responsible for the fires faced
lawsuits and bankruptcy, and an increased awareness around utility-caused wildfires led to
changes in regulations and legislation (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020b).
As a result of these and other incidents, utility companies are keenly focused on ways of
mitigating the risk and liability of their operations. Many of these mitigation strategies focus
on vegetation management and system hardening. Tree trimming and dead tree removal are
common practices that keep the space around high-voltage lines free of vegetation or falling
debris that could spark an ignition. Utility companies regularly inspect equipment to perform
any maintenance, repairs, or replacement of damaged or outdated equipment.
During periods of extreme risk, electric utilities have additionally started to stagewidespread
power outages in service territories in an effort to reduce the risk of wildfires. One of these
utility companies, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), held eight of these outages, termed
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, in 2019 alone (Pacific Gas & Electric Company
2020e). Although power shutoffs such as these had been carried out in the state before,
none previously had been executed at such a large scale. Caught between the danger of
devastating wildfires and the additional dangers and economic hardships that come with
power shutoffs, the public is outraged. Despite this, periodic utility-driven power outages
1
are expected to continue occurring for the foreseeable future.
1.1 Tensions in PSPS Events
Thousands of miles of overhead power lines run through wildland areas, and even the
smallest spark from utility equipment could ignite what develops into a massive fire. De-
energizing power lines, via execution of a PSPS event, could mean saving thousands of
wildland and urban acres from burning, and therefore, saving lives of California residents.
However, carrying out a PSPS event also has a negative effect on the activities and opera-
tions of homes, businesses, schools, healthcare facilities, and emergency responders. These
shutoffs create a myriad of dangers to the public, including disruptions in communication
and transportation. Because a widespread power outage is itself an emergency, PSPS events
are a test in emergency preparedness for communities at large.
For PG&E, a PSPS event is a way to reduce their liability in utility-associated wildfires.
The equipment used in the power grid requires regular maintenance, and in many cases,
upgrades to outdated systems. There is no question that failures are inherent to the grid.
Even with a sizable workforce, it has proven to be almost impossible to identify all hazards
and failures in the grid, especially when high-wind events occur as often as they do. Because
of this, a PSPS event may be the only sure way of reducing fire risk in some situations.
Another feature of the power grid that has become evident as a result of PSPS events is the
limited control structure. In most cases, controls for turning off power are not available at
the city-level, or even country-level. Rather, they are available for an entire region, which is
delimited by one or multiple interconnected power sources. Therefore, many regions could
be affected by a power outage due to a single high fire risk area.
A rework of the power grid will certainly be necessary in the future, but it is not a solution
to the very immediate wildfire threat California will experience in the coming years (Pacific
Gas & Electric Company 2020a). In the short-term, PSPS events will continue to occur
and will likely become more frequent. An effective and safe decision policy needs to be
developed to answer the following questions.
1. Under what conditions should the power be shut down?
2. Where should the power be shut down and for how long?
2
3. When and how should the power be restored?
However, there is considerable work to do before such a prescriptive decision model can be
developed.
1.2 Thesis Goals
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and examine tradeoffs in the timing, scope, and
duration of PSPS events. We conduct an exploratory data analysis to develop a descriptive
model of utility-causedwildfires and associated PSPS events.We then use our understanding
of these tradeoffs to build predictive models of PSPS events and their effects. Greater
understanding of both aspects can help improve the system to the benefit of both customers
and utility companies.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides background on
PSPS events and utility operations. This chapter also reviews related literature on fire-spread,
electric power operation, and risk mitigation. Chapter 3 introduces multiple data sources
and conducts an exploratory data analysis. We conduct a regression analysis in Chapter 4 to
gain insight on tradeoffs. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the work and offers recommendations
for future studies.
3




The prominent wildfire risk present in California today has developed over many years. Nat-
ural processes have shaped the landscape, and the actions of utility companies, government
agencies, and individuals over the past decade have set the foundation for the problems we
see today. There are four general scenarios in which electric utility equipment can cause
wildfire ignitions (Figure 2.1). Ignitions are commonly caused by failures or disruptions on
power lines or poles that are associated with strong winds or vegetation.
One of the primary responses to wildfire risk conducted by utility companies is vegetation
management. PG&E follows regulations set by the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) in General Order No. 95 (California Public Utilities Commission 2018). This ruling
requires “clearances of 4 feet around power lines in high fire-threat areas with recommended
minimum clearances of 12 feet or more at time of prune to ensure compliance year-round”,
which is shown in Figure 2.2 (California Public Utilities Commission 2018). Maintaining
these standards requires routine maintenance around power lines, and it does not fully
protect against vegetation pushed into lines or falling debris during strong wind events. For
this reason, utility companies consider de-energizing power lines.
In this chapter we provide background information on PSPS events, utility operations, and
previous research pertinent to this thesis.
2.1 Public Safety Power Shutoffs
This section describes the events leading up to, during, and after a PSPS event. It also
examines a past example of a power shutdown and the stakeholders involved.
2.1.1 Description of Event
PG&E describes a PSPS event as the need to turn off electricity to an area, in the interest
of community safety, when certain environmental conditions are forecasted (Pacific Gas &
Electric Company 2020e). These conditions could include high-speed, gusty winds, low
humidity levels, and an elevated risk of fire (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020e). The
5
Figure 2.1. Power Line Ignition Scenarios. Source: Karuk Tribe Department
of Natural Resources (2018).
purpose of a PSPS event is to de-energize the portion(s) of the power grid subject to these
conditions in order to mitigate the risk of wildfires potentially ignited (or intensified) by
utility operations. A single PSPS event could leave nearly one million customers without
electric power, spread across several cities and counties (Pacific Gas & Electric Company
2020a). Thus, the execution of a PSPS event requires decision-makers to consider not
only when and where to shut the power off, but also how to keep the affected community
informed.
PG&E does not have a set schedule for power shutdowns, as the criteria for them are
"dynamic and naturally unpredictable" (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020e). In the
recent past, the shutdowns were executed several times a year (roughly three to eight
6
Figure 2.2. Regulations for Vegetation Management. Source: Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (2020g).
events), during the California fire season from late spring to early fall (Pacific Gas&Electric
Company 2020e). As a result, PG&E monitors current and upcoming weather conditions,
as well as terrain and forest conditions, year-round in an effort to identify potential wildfire
hazards.
However, there are (at least) three distinctly different processes involved in PSPS events,
each of which evolves over different timescales: natural processes involving the wilderness
itself, human processes involved with development and forest management, and utility
processes involved in the operation of the grid (see Figure 2.3). These parallel processes
include events that occur years, months, and days before a PSPS event.
A utility company begins to consider the possibility of a PSPS event once forecasted
conditions indicate a high-likelihood of wildfire. More specifically, PG&E operates at five
different levels of PSPS potential (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020d).
1. “Not expected”: conditions that would warrant a PSPS event are not expected in
the next seven days.
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2. “Elevated”: the upcoming weather conditions (within seven days) are being
monitored for elevated risk.
3. “PSPS Watch”: the possibility of a PSPS event in upcoming days is likely.
PG&E’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) activates and prepares to carry
out the event. This level of operation is typically issued 72 hours in advance of
an expected PSPS.
4. “PSPS Warning”: the EOC is active and customers residing in the affected area
are notified. Although this level of operation suggests that a PSPS event is very
likely, it does not guarantee it.
5. "Weather All Clear": the severe weather event has passed and it is safe for PG&E
crews to begin the power restoration process.
The PSPS concludes when electric power has been restored to all affected regions of the
electric power grid (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020e). As indicated in the “PSPS
Warning” level, none of these operating conditions guarantee that a PSPS event will or will
not occur (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020d). Rapid and unexpected changes in the
weather forecast could escalate or de-escalate conditions on an hourly basis.
In addition to deciding when a PSPS event will take place, PG&E decision-makers must
also determine where it will take place. This means considering not only which transmission
and/or distribution lines to de-energize, but also which customer regions will be left without
power. Ideally, only the lines and customers in the high fire-risk areas would be impacted.
However, due to the control structure of the electric power grid, a community that is not
at risk may also experience a power shutdown (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020e).
Power lines travel long distances across the state, and controls are present at different scales
(whether that be at the city-level or regional). Rather, they are available for zones, which
are delimited by one or multiple interconnected power sources (Pacific Gas & Electric
Company 2020c). A PSPS event may extend far past the area where wildfire mitigation is
necessary. This creates a tradeoff between wildfire prevention and impact on the public.
8
Figure 2.3. Wildfire Progression Timeline. There are three timelines – (1)
Nature, (2) Human response, (3) Utility response – which occur in parallel
and interact. The top timeline shows some of the events that create fire-
prone forests, the actual ignition event, and the natural dynamics, recovery,
and growth that occur afterwards. The middle timeline shows the steps taken
by fire and emergency agencies to detect, respond to, and control wildfires.
The bottom timeline highlights the sequence of events that occur during a
PSPS.
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One way to measure community impact is through the number of households, businesses,
and healthcare facilities that report not having power during a PSPS event. Still, this
tends to grossly underestimate the number of individuals affected. This is because PG&E
measures customers based on customer accounts, but a single account can serve multiple
individuals (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019c). Measuring the economic impact on
the community is another alternative. Most businesses, including ones deemed “essential,”
are not able to operate during a power shutdown. Businesses may stall the production and
sales of goods, food in grocery stores may spoil, and waged workers may not be getting paid.
These all manifest as economic losses for the community. Less tangible are the additional
dangers the public must face as a result of power shutdowns. Large-scale power outages
disrupt transportation and communication; this is the very same transportation needed for
evacuations and communication required to report fire hazards and up-to-date information
to residents in affected areas. An outage also decreases the readiness of health facilities
and first responders, even when backup power generation is available. The community
consequences could be minimal or much more adverse depending on how long the power
is off.
A PSPS will last at least as long as the high-risk weather event, which may be unpredictable
(Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020e). The duration of the entire event is also determined
by how long it takes to turn the power back on. Once the weather event has passed, the
restoration process occurs, which has its own associated fire risks. PG&E ground and
aerial crews must visually inspect power lines to identify any damage that could have
occurred while lines were de-energized (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020e). Before
these crews can restore power, damage to equipment and/or any other hazards found need
to be addressed. The time it takes to restore power varies greatly, and is dependent on (1)
the number and length of the lines that must be inspected, and (2) the aerial and ground
resources available. In 2019, PG&E’s goal was to restore power to all de-energized circuits
within 24 daylight-hours (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019b). Therefore, a PSPS could
leave customers without electric power for multiple days— days when an immediate fire
risk may not even be present. Although determining the duration of a PSPS event is part of
the decision-making process, it is not totally within the control of the utility company.
A PSPS may reduce the risk of fire, but it also creates economic, social, and health hazards,
which decision makers must consider.
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2.1.2 Example PSPS event
This section reviews the timeline of events and decisions made for a past PSPS. The
information here was derived from a report to the CPUC in Pacific Gas & Electric Company
(2019c).
In November of 2019, PG&E held a PSPS event in an effort to reduce the wildfire risk in
communities north of the San Francisco Bay Area. Strong winds, low humidity levels, and
low moisture content in dead and live fuels created an elevated fire risk. The event began
on November 20 at 06:20 when the first circuit was de-energized and ended on November
21 at 21:56 when the last circuit was restored, lasting approximately 39 hours (Pacific Gas
& Electric Company 2019c).
Beginning a week earlier, PG&E weather models predicted gusty and high-speed winds in
the regions as far west as the North Bay and as far east as the North Sierra (Figure 2.4).
On November 15, PG&E set these regions to an "Elevated" status for a potential PSPS, and
two days later, the EOC was fully operational and the status changed to a “PSPS Watch”.
At this time, utility operators identified sections of the electric power grid that were at risk
and needed to be de-energized. For distribution lines, PG&E determined which circuits
would be affected and at what device level. For assets at the transmission level, risk was
analyzed based on the structure conditions, past outage data, and the most recent inspection
of equipment. On November 18 and 19, the National Weather Service (NWS) declared
multiple Red Flag Warnings (RFWs) in the area, further verifying the forecasted weather
patterns.
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Figure 2.4. November 2019 Power Shutoff Areas. These maps show three of
the affected regions in the PSPS event that occurred on November 20 and
21, 2019. The right panel shows an overview of the three Northern California
regions, and the left panels provide a more detailed view. The purple-shading
scale is a measure of the impact on residents, businesses, and facilities in the
region, which is calculated as the total number of customer-hours without
power. A darker shade means that more customers, more hours, or both
were part of the PSPS event. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company
(2020a). 12
As weather conditions continued to be monitored, PG&E actively engaged with customers
in the potentially affected areas. Notifications occurred in three phases: (1) advanced no-
tifications, (2) notifications during the shutdown, and (3) notifications once the power was
restored in an area. The utility company sent over 49,900 direct notifications to customers via
calls, text messaging, and e-mail (Pacific Gas&Electric Company 2019c). Social media and
local news outlets were also used to raise awareness of the potential de-energization. Medi-
cal baseline customers, who have special energy needs due to medical conditions, were the
focus of additional outreach efforts, including door-to-door contact when acknowledgement
of other communication methods was not made.
With all customers notified and no change in the weather conditions, the final decision
to de-energize the identified lines was made on the morning of November 20. It was not
made, however, until all affected critical facilities, such as emergency responders, were
confirmed to have some form of back-up power generation to continue operations (Pacific
Gas & Electric Company 2019c). During the event, 49,202 distribution customers were
de-energized across the region. Of these customers, 42,453 were classified as residential,
5,409 were classified as commercial or industrial, and of the total there were 2,432 medical
baseline customers (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019c).
On the evening of November 20, PG&E issued the first “Weather All Clear” notification and
began the power-restoration process. All affected lines were visually inspected to identify
any damage or other hazards that could have occurred during the power shutdown. PG&E
had pre-positioned and prepared field resources and helicopters to begin the inspections
and power restoration immediately. For this event, 5,600 personnel and 45 helicopters were
used, and 15 cases of damages and hazards needed to be repaired and cleared (Pacific Gas
& Electric Company 2019c).
An after-action review was conducted on November 22, where internal and external feed-
back was collected from emergency response teams, the California Governor’s Office of
Emergency Services (Cal OES), and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Pro-
tection (CAL FIRE). Four of the key areas of improvement identified were: (1) enhanced
scope ability and timing accuracy, (2) strengthening data quality, (3) improved estimation
of restoration time, and (4) improved map precision.
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2.1.3 Stakeholders and Perspectives
There are four entities heavily involved in the execution and impact of a PSPS event: (1) the
utility company, (2) customers, (3) emergency responders, and (4) governmental agencies.
All stakeholders want to maximize safety during a PSPS event and during the fire season.
However, they all have different perspectives on how to best achieve these goals. Each
stakeholder also has a different way of characterizing the risk associated with a PSPS.
Utility Companies
Utility companies are a primary stakeholder. They have the greatest responsibility and the
greatest liability when it comes to the planning, execution, and consequences of a power
shutoff. The mission of PG&E is “to safely and reliably deliver affordable and clean energy
to our customers and communities every single day, while building the energy network of
tomorrow” (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020f). With millions of customers spread
across north and central California, providing reliable power in the face of growing wildfire
risk is a challenging problem (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020f). In essence, PG&E
must create a robust decision policy for power shutdowns that balances the tradeoffs between
wildfire mitigation and community impact.
PG&E is facing multiple lawsuits and has filed for bankruptcy as a result of the role the
company played in wildfires the past few years (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020b). On
the other end of the spectrum, PG&E has also faced backlash for conducting PSPS events
to avoid the catastrophic wildfires of the past. As a company, their main objective is to
minimize liability. This breaks down into three smaller goals: (1) minimizing wildfire risk,
(2) minimizing the number of customers without power, and (3) maintaining the perception
of reliable electric power delivery. PG&E, as well as all other utility companies in the state,
is regulated by the CPUC. One of the duties of the CPUC is to set operating constraints
on utility companies, such as service standards and safety rules (California Public Utilities
Commission 2020). These regulations may restrict decision-making for the utility company
in regards to a PSPS. Additionally, equipment maintenance schedules, assets on private or
protected land, and the inherent uncertainty of forecasting weather and fire conditions also
limit utility operations. For utility companies, PG&E among others, the decision to turn
off power is a tradeoff between wildfire safety and reliability in the eyes of the customer.
This tradeoff has far-reaching consequences in the economic realm and for policies, both of
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which have immediate and long-term impacts.
Customers
Customers come in many forms. There are households with families, students, and essential
workers. There are businesses ranging anywhere from a “Mom-and-Pop” shop to a com-
mercial space housing global companies. Hospitals, doctors’ offices, and emergency clinics
also fall under this umbrella. Customers want reliable electric power provided at rates that
reflect the quality of service. They also prioritize their well-being and the safety of their
property and possessions; these could be put at risk during both a wildfire and a PSPS event.
In terms of the provision of electric power, customers are limited by the controls afforded
to them by the utility companies; this could mean devices like smart meters or back-up
generators. Risk mitigation for customers comes in the form of disaster preparedness which
can mitigate the dangers presented by wildfires and shutdowns. Compared to the utility
companies, customers think about risks and consequences at a smaller geographic scale and
a shorter time span.
Emergency Responders
Firefighters, police, state troopers, and paramedics play a key role in PSPS events. They
are not only responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, and the en-
vironment, but they also serve as liaisons between the public and utility companies and
governmental agencies during PSPS events and wildfires. Their main objectives are to
raise awareness about these emergencies and to manage people and resources during them.
Like the utility companies, they are limited by the information available in environmental
forecasts. First responders are typically thinking about risk at a regional level.
Government Agencies
There are three state and federal agencies which hold particularly high stakes in California
regarding power shutdowns andwildfires: CAL FIRE, theU.S. Forest Service, andCal OES.
CAL FIRE is dedicated to the fire protection and conservation of the millions of acres of
California’s wildlands; this organization also provides varied emergency services to over
half of the counties in the state (CAL FIRE 2020). The mission of the Forest Service is to
maintain the health, diversity, and productivity of the country’s forests (U.S. Forest Service
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2020). In the state of California, much of the forest management relating to wildfire control
and mitigation falls upon this organization. Cal OES is tasked with assuring the state’s
readiness to respond to and recover from disasters and hazards (Cal OES 2020). These three
agencies communicate andworkwith each other, as well as with the other three stakeholders.
The combined efforts of forestry management (on the part of Forest Service) and vegetation
removal (on the part of utilities and CAL FIRE) prevents wildfires and PSPS events from
occurring in heavily populated areas. By working together, local police departments and
Cal OES, lead outreach programs to make sure California residents are informed about the
environmental risks in their area, as well how to prepare for an emergency. Overall, these
agencies are limited by funding and resources which determines how involved they are with
the community.
2.2 Characterizing Wildfire Risk
Electric utility companies are constantlymonitoringweather conditions to assess thewildfire
risk. This involves several entities, including local meteorologists and weather services,
as well as state and national agencies (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020e). PG&E
considers multiple environmental factors, which could all warrant a PSPS event, but may
not be sufficient on a case-by-case basis. The weather factors are: humidity levels, forecasted
winds, and dry fuel conditions (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019c). A low humidity
level, typically less than 20%, is an indicator of heightened wildfire risk (Pacific Gas &
Electric Company 2019c). Sustained and gusty winds with speeds greater than 25 miles per
hour could also elevate the fire risk (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019c); this risk is
tightly coupled with temperature and terrain. High-speed winds also pose a threat to utility
equipment; lines could become tangled, poles could be knocked over, and nearby foliage
could come into contact with conductive materials. Additionally, fuel moisture content can
indicate the fire potential in an area. Fuel moisture measures the amount of water present in
dead and live organic material, expressed as a percentage of the dry weight of the type of
fuel (NOAA 2020). For example, in the Los Padres National Forest, fuel moisture content
may be measured from tree bark, canopy foliage, and debris on the forest floor. When fuel
moisture content is low, fires can start easily and spread rapidly (NOAA 2020). Data on
humidity, winds, and dry fuels is collected from local weather stations and by PG&E field
crews (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019c).
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Advisories and warnings issued by state and national agencies also play a major role in
PG&E’s decision process when executing a PSPS event. The NWS issues RFWs, which can
lead to a PSPS event in conjunction with other conditions (Pacific Gas & Electric Company
2020e). Thesewarnings indicate that high temperatures, very lowhumidity levels, and strong
winds are predicted to combine, making wildfires very likely. The National Interagency
Fire Center (NIFC) also designates critical burn areas and identifies high fire-risk days
(Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020e). These advisories, along with the climate data,
are collected and evaluated at PG&E’s wildfire Safety Operations Center (SOC), where it is
decided whether a not a PSPS event is likely to occur within a one-week time frame (Pacific
Gas & Electric Company 2020e).
During the planning of a PSPS event, regional maps also aid decision-makers. There are
three maps in particular: (1) PG&EGeographic Zones map, (2) CPUC Fire Threat map, and
(3) Fire Potential Index map. The first shows the boundaries of PG&E’s service territory.
The second designates areas with an elevated risk of fires due to electric power lines, and
the third shows historical data on fire risk.
The PG&E Geographic Zones (Figure 2.5) map gives insight into the control structure of
the power grid. It shows nine regions of PG&E’s service territory which, to some degree, are
interconnected by the lines that carry electricity (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2020e).
Customers within a zone are likely to experience similar weather and have similar terrain.
Therefore, these zones can be interpreted as units where a PSPS event could occur and effect
most customers within. It is important to note that this map is very general; it is meant as a
way to visualize and conceptualize the degree to which a utility company has control over
providing power to some homes and businesses and not others. The key takeaway is that
customers who are not at risk of a fire could still be affected by a PSPS event due to the
connections and complexities of the electric power grid.
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Figure 2.5. PG&E Geographic Zones. Source: Pacific Gas & Electric Com-
pany (2020c).
The CPUC Fire Threat map (Figure 2.6) defines three types of regions— Zone 1 (high
hazard), Tier 2 (elevated risk), and Tier 3 (extreme risk)—which are collectively known as
the High Fire Threat District (HFTD).
• Zone 1 areas occur where there are both high tree mortality rates and critical in-
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frastructure such as roads, utilities, and public buildings (Pacific Gas & Electric
Company 2019b). Dead and decaying trees pose a direct threat to infrastructure and
their removal is necessary to reduce the risk of wildfires.
• Tier 2 areas have an elevated risk for "utility-associated" wildfires (Pacific Gas &
Electric Company 2019b). These regions have a greater likelihood of fire ignition
and spread compared to Zone 1 regions. Tier 2 areas would benefit from increased
utility regulations, which may reduce the risk of fire (Pacific Gas & Electric Company
2019b).
• Tier 3 areas are at extreme risk of "utility-associated" fires. These regions have the
greatest likelihood of a utility-ignited fire that would impact people and property.
These areas require strict utility regulation to reduce the risk of fire (Pacific Gas &
Electric Company 2019b).
Similar to the previous map, the Fire Potential Index (FPI) map (Figure 2.7), shows fire risk
but at a more granular scale and in a quantifiable way. The borders on this map represent
Fire Index Areas (FIAs), which are sub-regions in PG&E’s service territory. The FPI is
an indicator of live vegetation flammability based on moisture content, and is scaled from
R1 to R5, with five levels of increasing flammability and therefore, increasing fire risk
(Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019b). FPI measures are calculated daily for each FIA;
days when conditions are at R4 or R5 are considered high-risk for wildfires (Pacific Gas
& Electric Company 2019b). On these days, restrictions on utility operations go into effect
to mitigate the potential for ignition. The shading in Figure 2.7 shows the total number of
these high-risk days that occurred in a particular FIA in a year. Areas with darker shades
of red are more prone to conditions that are likely to ignite a wildfire, especially through
utility operations.
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Figure 2.6. CPUC Fire Threat Map. Adapted from California Public Utilities
Commission (2020).
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Figure 2.7. Fire Potential Index by Year. PG&E measures the Fire Potential
Index (FPI) on a daily basis as a measure for fire risk. This metric is scaled
from R1 to R5. At R4 and R5 conditions, restrictions on utility operations go
into effect to mitigate the potential for ignition. The figure shows the number
of high-risk (R4 and R5) days in the delimited Fire Index Areas (FIA). There
are two patterns present across the years. The first is that there are FIAs
that consistently experience more high risk days. The second is that from
2015 to 2019 there is an overall increase in the number of high risk days
across all FIAs. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2020a).
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2.3 Previous Research on PSPS-Related Topics
This section reviews selected works pertinent to the question of study. It covers fire propa-
gation models, electric power operation, and risk mitigation that fall along a spectrum from
high fidelity (high complexity) to low fidelity (low complexity).
2.3.1 Wildfire Modeling
Where a forest fire starts and how it spreads are longstanding questions that have been studied
by researchers and utility companies alike. Graham et al. (2004) review the vast literature
related to the topic of wildfires. Wildfire ignition and dynamics are primarily governed
by three factors: (1) weather, (2) flammable fuels, and (3) the physical setting (Graham
et al. 2004). Important weather characteristics are wind, temperature, precipitation, and
humidity (Graham et al. 2004). Flammable fuels, which consist of live and dead vegetation
and debris can vary in composition, amount, distribution, and moisture content which all
influence wildfires (Graham et al. 2004). The physical setting has multiple components
which should also be considered in wildfire dynamics — slope, elevation, relief, and soil
(Graham et al. 2004). These factors influence wildfires over both short- and long-term
timescales, and they can interact with each other in complex ways (Graham et al. 2004). All
of these factors and their interactions must be considered in wildfire modeling.
Although no model or simulation can capture all of the variability and randomness of a true
fire, some capture particular details better than others. With all fire spread models, there
is a tradeoff between complexity of inputs and calculations versus computational effort.
Wildfire studies and modeling can be split into two broad categories— (1) ignitions and (2)
fire spread/dynamics. We will highlight a few references, among the vast literature on the
topics, that are relevant to this thesis.
Modeling Ignitions
Xu et al. (2016) present a risk assessment of ignition occurrence near high-voltage power
lines in Hubei Province, China. The authors utilize remote sensing and Geographic Informa-
tion System (GIS) data from past ignition events on weather, vegetation cover, and terrain to
build a logistic regression model. This model was used to create ignition probability maps
along power lines, which was validated against a test set of ignition data (Xu et al. 2016).
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Although the results of this case study are applied to the specific region and utilities, similar
methods can be used to study ignitions elsewhere.
Massada et al. (2013) compare the performance of three ignition-distribution models with
respect to prediction accuracy, variable importance, and spatial patterns. The first is a
GeneralizedLinearModel (GLM)with a binomial response (logit link function) and variable
selection based on Akaike Information Criterion (Massada et al. 2013). The remaining two
models are a Random Forest (RF) and Maximum Entropy model (Massada et al. 2013).
The analysis found similar model fit and variable importance across the three methods. The
RF and Maximum Entropy had slightly better prediction accuracy compared to the GLM
(Massada et al. 2013). Massada et al. (2013) observed the greatest difference in spatial
patterns, where the Maximum Entropy model produced very different results than the other
models. The authors recommend that ignition-probability analysis be conducted by either
comparing results from multiple models or combining models to create an ensemble.
Modeling Fire Spread
Cortez and Morais (2007) present a data mining approach to predict the final size (burned
area) of forest fires, using data collected from fires in the north-east of Portugal. Cortez
and Morais (2007) build several regression models using five techniques—(1) multiple
regression, (2) decision tree, (3) RF, (4) neural net, and (5) support vector machines—
applied to spatial, temporal, meteorological, and fire weather index variables. The most
accurate model is a Support Vector Machine with a subset of meteorological variables
relating to temperature, relative humidity, wind, and rain (Cortez and Morais 2007).
Peterson et al. (2009) develops a raster fire spreadmodel, called HFire, capable of simulating
single-fire events or long-term fire systems. It is a spatial spreadmodel that is appropriate for
use on grass or shrubland terrain. The model is based on the Rothermal rate-of-spread equa-
tion, which resembles heat transfer with analogous empirically derived terms for wildfires.
This equation calculates the "steady-state rate of fire spread in the direction of maximum fire
spread" (Peterson et al. 2009). Complexity is added with a raster approach, which allows fire
to spread between neighboring cells over multiple time steps. The simulation, with source
code written in the C Programming Language, is efficient and can be used to understand
the dynamics of a progressing wildfire events (Peterson et al. 2009).
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Petrovic et al. (2012) implements a basic model to represent fire spread which uses queuing
theory and stochastic processes. This fire spread model is used to analyze tradeoffs in fire
suppression relating to timing and strength of suppression efforts. It differs from HFire
primarily in its spatial modeling. The flammable terrain is broken up into discrete parcels
which become part of a queueing system when they ignite. The size of the fire and rate of
spread scale with the size of the queue. Although it is not a highly detailed model, it can be
“used to examine basic relationships” between inputs and simulation results (Petrovic et al.
2012).
Cruz andAlexander (2019) present a “rule of thumb” for the forward rate of fire spread based
solely on wind characteristics — the rate of spread of a fire can be approximated as 10%
of the average wind speed present (in the same unit of measurement). Cruz and Alexander
(2019) develop this simple rule by using an ordinary least squares linear regression on data
published in wildfire case studies. The datasets cover fires in conifer and dry eucalyptus
forests and temperate shrublands, and data on wind speed measured in the open averaged
over a 10-minute time interval. The rule of thumb works best when applied to dry fuel and
high wind conditions. It can be adjusted to accurately predict fire spread using other kinds
of wind measurements (Cruz and Alexander 2019). It should not be used for grassland
environments (Cruz and Alexander 2019).
2.3.2 Electric Power Operation
There exists a vast literature on electric power operation. For a general introduction to
electric grid operation, see Wood and Wollenberg (1996). To understand the evolution of
electric power operation, see O’Neill et al. (2006). This section highlights a select few
references that relate to this thesis.
Salmerón et al. (2004) present a prescriptive optimization model representing the linearized
operation of an electric transmission system, and use a bi-level “attacker-defender” formu-
lation to identify worst-case disruptions to system components that result in the largest load
shed (power outage) even after the operator re-balances system resources. Salmerón et al.
(2009) expand this work with an efficient decomposition technique for solving this type
network interdiction problem.
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Nagarajan et al. (2016) present a prescriptive model for the operation of a three-phase
electric distribution system and consider design options for making the system resilient to
failure. Petri (2017) builds on thiswork to investigate the operational resilience of the electric
distribution system. The model borrows from attacker-defender paradigms to minimize the
amount of load not met, in an attempt to guarantee that all electricity demand is met for a
distribution system. Switches in the “open” and “closed” states act as decision variables in
the network model, subject to various physical constraints.
Mohagheghi and Rebennack (2015) solve a two-stage stochastic nonlinear optimization
problem for operating a transmission power grid during an advancing wildfire. Specifically,
they model the wildfire only as related to its effects on the transmission lines. Rather than
model the fine detail of fire spread and the electric power gird separately, the authors create a
coupled systemwith parts relevant to the question study. Themodel is heavily parameterized
with inputs for conductor specifications, fire spread rates, atmospheric conditions, and
heat transfer. Mohagheghi and Rebennack (2015) highlight the tradeoffs between making
informed decisions and timely decisions in the context of effective fire mitigation.
Trakas and Hatziargyriou (2017) studies a similar question to Mohagheghi and Rebennack
(2015) on an electrical distribution system (rather than transmission). They use a nonlinear
approach with mixed integer linear programming and quadratic constraints to provide a
solution to the operation of a distribution system against a spreading wildfire. They aim to
minimize the expected social cost (in terms of load shed) in both scenarios where a fire is
and is not present to point out the differences in optimal utility operations.
2.3.3 Risk Mitigation
A variety of risk frameworks and mitigation strategies are present in the literature. Here we
highlight two in particular: the first in the context of wildfires affecting the wildland-urban
interface; the second in the context of large-scale electricity outages.
Calkin et al. (2014) outline the principles of risk management and highlights the ability of
a strong risk framework to decrease the potential for losses. The paper discusses how the
effectiveness of a wildfire mitigation plan (and any plan for that matter) is mainly based on
“how the problem is perceived and how the objectives are defined” (Calkin et al. 2014).
The main objective, which is to mitigate risk, can be broken down into more specific ideas.
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Each of these ideas can then be linked to a specific action, with a responsible agent (as an
example, this could be any of the stakeholders in section 2.1.3). This kind of risk framework
can be used to identify strategies of varying degrees that produce the targeted decrease in
risk.
Eyer and Rose (2019) present a broader approach to risk reduction that looks at the trade-
offs between mitigation and resilience. They apply this methodology to large-scale power
outages. More specifically, they categorize mitigation strategies as those that preemptively
reduce the possibility of power outages. They also define three stages of resilience invest-
ments which (1) reduce the dependency for electricity before the outage occurs, (2) decrease
the losses during an outage, (3) decrease the recovery time after an outage occurs. Overall,
they find that resilience, rather than mitigation strategies, for large-scale power outages may
be better able to reduce total cost and impact on a community.
2.4 Modeling PSPS Elements
Modeling the dynamics of PSPS events requires (at least) three tasks: modeling fire spread,
modeling electric power operation, and modeling the interaction between the two systems.
To date, there has been very little in modeling and analysis of PSPS events. Rhodes et al.
(2020) (preprint) is the first to present the “optimized power shut-off problem” that considers
the tradeoffs between preventative wildfire risk management by utility companies and the
disruption to utility customers.
The first step they take is to assess wildfire risk associated with the electric power grid.
Rhodes et al. (2020) assign risk values to individual components based on (1) predeter-
mined geographic wildfire risk and (2) component characteristics (such as voltage and
maintenance). Rhodes et al. (2020) assume that this risk manifests itself as an ignition
probability in the direct vicinity of the component. For the purposes of this study, Rhodes
et al. (2020) assume that all generators and buses have the same probability of ignition, and
therefore, the wildfire risk depends only on geographic location. The ignition probability of
transmission lines is a function of voltage and line length (Rhodes et al. 2020).
Each component can either be energized or de-energized. A de-energized component has
zero wildfire risk. The system of components is subject to physical constraints present in
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an operational power grid (Rhodes et al. 2020). Rhodes et al. (2020) develop a family of
constraints each for dependencies between components, generator limits, and power flow.
This study focuses on direct current (DC) power flow. The overall risk of a section of the
power grid is the sum of the risk values of all energized transmission lines, generators,
buses, and loads (Rhodes et al. 2020).
Next, Rhodes et al. (2020) represent the impact of power-outages on customers. They
measure this as the fraction of load demand delivered during the PSPS event compared
to normal operations (when all lines are energized). The total load delivered is the sum
of the loads carried across all components. This study also discusses an extension of
this formulation where individual component loads can be weighted differently based on
operational priorities (Rhodes et al. 2020). Rhodes et al. (2020) provides “hospitals or other
essential services” as an example. However, for the purposes of this study, all weights are
set to one (Rhodes et al. 2020).
The objective function for the optimization problem is to maximize the load delivered, while
minimizing the wildfire risk as expressed by Rhodes et al. (2020) in Equation 2.1:
max (1 − U)C>C0; − U' 5 8A4 (2.1)
where C>C0; is the total load delivered and ' 5 8A4 is the overall wildfire risk of utility
equipment. The U ∈ [0, 1] parameter captures the tradeoffs inherent to PSPS events — a
small U prioritizes the load objective, while a large U prioritizes the wildfire risk objective
(Rhodes et al. 2020). This summarizes what the authors called the Optimized Power Shutoff
(OPS) problem, which is amixed-integer linear program (MILP). The comprehensivemodel
formulation can be found in Rhodes et al. (2020).
As a basis for comparison, Rhodes et al. (2020) develop two additional heuristics which
model the PSPS decision-making process. Each heuristic is implemented as a two-step
process. The first step determines which components will be de-energized, based only on
the wildfire risk (Rhodes et al. 2020). The second step aims to maximize the total load
delivered, given the subset of energized components that remain (Rhodes et al. 2020). The
two heuristics apply to the first step and differ in the way in which wildfire risk is used to
make decisions:
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1. Area heuristic: Given that the power grid is partitioned into operational areas, the
overall risk of each area is calculated. If this value is greater than a threshold risk
value, then all components in the area are de-energized.
2. Transmission heuristic: If the risk value of an individual transmission line exceeds a
threshold risk value, then the line is de-energized.
The second step is implemented as a maximum load delivery optimization problem with
similar constraints to the OPS (Rhodes et al. 2020). It is also a MILP.
The three model formulations— OPS, area heuristic, transmission heuristic— are applied
to the IEEE RTS-GMLC 96-bus test case, located in an area covering Los Angeles, Las
Vegas, and the north-western edge of Arizona (Rhodes et al. 2020). The authors create a
simple wildfire risk map, based on local news reports, which they overlay on the notional
electric power grid. The map shows four levels of possible fire risk: low-, medium-, high-,
and extreme-risk (Rhodes et al. 2020). For the OPS and transmission heuristics, rather than
solve for a single optimal solution, the authors choose to solve the problem for a range of
U values (for the former) and a range of risk-threshold values (for the latter) to create a
Pareto frontier of solutions that shows the tradeoffs between wildfire risk and electric power
disruption. For the area heuristic, a single threshold risk value was chosen to target the
single extreme-risk area on the map.
The results reveal four primary insights, as discussed by Rhodes et al. (2020).
1. The threemodel formulations provide different levels of “targeting”. The area heuristic
is the least targetedmethod; it shuts off too great of an area which results in the greatest
load shed and the smallest reduction in wildfire risk, compared to the other models.
The transmission heuristic is more targeted as it considers risk for individual assets
but it does not consider the consequences of shutting them off. The OPS problem
is the most targeted approach as it considers both the wildfire risk and downstream
effects of shutting off power to certain components.
2. The OPS problem consistently provides better solutions (less load shed and greater
risk reduction), compared to the other two methods.
3. The OPS problem allows for solutions where high-risk lines remain energized, given
that they carry a relatively large amount of power.
4. The electric power grid topology for the lowest risk solution has a tree-like, or radial,
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structure.
This study is an important first step towards understanding the benefits and costs of power
shutoffs as an avenue for wildfire risk mitigation. However, the formulated OPS problem
is missing crucial details that should be supplemented in future work. Two of the most
important factors in determining the probability of ignition and the potential for fire spread
are the weather and fuels, both of which are not considered by Rhodes et al. (2020). In
terms of measuring the impact of a PSPS event, Rhodes et al. (2020) does not consider the
duration of an outage, or the number or of type of customers who lose power. Additionally,
the potential for electric faults that occur after de-energization and/or during the restoration
process are not considered in the risk calculations. Incorporating these details requires a vast
amount of knowledge and data on the particular power grid and landscape being studied.
The approach of Rhodes et al. (2020) considers different levels of fidelity for different part
of the problem. There is a spectrum of fidelity that should be considered whenmodeling; the
spectrum can be broken into three broad categories (Figure 2.8). High-fidelity models most
closely resemble reality; they require large amounts of input data and complex computations
to capture the details of complicated behavior. Low-fidelity models require less input data;
they simplify complicated behaviors, but still allow for Monte Carlo-type analyses to gain
insight on real-world processes. High-fidelity models for all three tasks are the ultimate goal
for PSPS stakeholders and should be used as decision-making tools in the future. However,
these computationally-intensive methods are beyond the scope of the efforts of this thesis.
Low-fidelity models were considered for this thesis, but gaps were found in the required
input knowledge and data. Rather than focus on high- or low-fidelity models, this thesis
seeks to close that gap and examine the data necessary for more complicated modeling.
29
Figure 2.8. Hierarchy of PSPS Model Fidelity. Wildfire and electric power





Since 2015, PG&E’s electrical equipment has sparked over 2,000 ignitions (Pacific Gas &
Electric Company 2019g). Many of these ignitions grew into wildfires, 30 of which burned
over 100 acres each (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019g). Some of these fires, shown
in Table 3.1, are among the largest and deadliest in California’s history. As a result of these
catastrophic wildfires, PG&E faced lawsuits, filed for bankruptcy in 2019, and came under
increased scrutiny from regulatory agencies and California residents (Pacific Gas & Electric
Company 2020b). PG&E’s publicly available reports and data were closely examined and
hundreds of additional data request were made by various agencies. Altogether, this array of
data provides a broad and detailed viewof the utility company’s electric power infrastructure,
operations, and decision-making process.
Table 3.1. PG&E-Ignited Fires from 2015 to 2019. Some of these are among
the largest and/or deadliest in the history of California.
Fire Name Date County Acres Structures Lost/Damaged Deaths
Butte Fire Sept. 2015 Butte 70,868 921 2
Tubbs Fire Oct. 2017 Napa, Sonoma 36,807 5,643 22
Atlas Fire Oct. 2017 Napa, Solano 51,624 781 6
Redwood Valley Fire Oct. 2018 Mendocino 36,523 590 9
County Fire June 2018 Napa, Yolo 90,288 29 1
Camp Fire Nov. 2019 Butte 153,336 18,804 85
Kincade Fire Oct. 2019 Sonoma 77,758 434 0
3.1 Data Collection
As a starting point, we gather data from PG&E and other publicly available sources on
wildfire weather, the electric power grid, and the impact of PSPS events. We use this data to
construct multiple datasets to support this study. The data collected is in three forms—GIS
files (e.g., .gdb, .dbf, .shp), comma-separated value data files (i.e., .csv), and written reports.
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This data comes from four different sources: (1) PG&E’s PSPS reports to the CPUC, (2)
PG&E’s 2020 Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP), (3) additional data requests that resulted
from the WMP, and (4) the other sources.
PSPS Reports to the CPUC
Following every PSPS event, PG&E is required to make a report to the CPUC describing
“key information including the rationale, sequence of events, and activities for [the] PSPS
event” (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019d). These reports include information on the
power-restoration process.
2020 Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP)
The WMP is a report authored by PG&E that provides details and lessons learned from
the 2019 wildfire season, along with plans for future programs and safety measures (Pacific
Gas & Electric Company 2020a). It includes supplemental data files which are referenced
in the written report, including geospatial files for all PSPS events that occurred in 2019.
These files provide the circuits that were planned for de-energization for each PSPS event,
as well as the following metrics: HFTD-class of the affected circuit, start date and time of
the outage, duration of outage, total number of customers affected by the outage, and the
number of each type of customer (i.e., residential, commercial, medical baseline) serviced
on each circuit. The WMP also provides a geospatial data on fire ignitions created by
PG&E’s electrical equipment from 2015-2019. This data includes site of ignition, final fire
size, and the suspected cause.
Data Requests
In response to the WMP, several agencies requested additional data, which PG&E also
made publicly available. A wide range of inquiries were made, making this data source a
valuable resource. We acquired geospatial data on PG&E’s electric power grid (locations
of both transmission and distribution assets), which included metadata such as ignition and
failure probabilities, line-miles in each HFTD-class, and scores and ranks related to wildfire
risk. Also included is geospatial data for:
• PG&E’s administrative boundaries — this is a hierarchical structure that starts at the
entire service territory, splits into regions, divisions, and finally districts;
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• Customer location — this is a one-mile squared resolution grid with counts of cus-
tomers within each square; and
• Wildfire-related weather — this includes information on RFW days and weather
stations with wind measurements.
Other Sources
WeuseGISfiles from theCPUC that define theHFTD (discussed in Section 2.2).We also use
historic electricity usage data from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO).
3.2 Datasets
In this section, we take a closer look at data on the following topics: (1) the electric power
grid, (2) utility-caused ignitions, (3) wildfire weather, and (4) past PSPS events.
3.2.1 Electric Power Grid
PG&E’s electric power grid services customers across north, central, and southern Cali-
fornia. The service territory is divided hierarchically into regions (largest areas), divisions,
and districts (smallest areas), shown in Figure 3.1 (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019h).
These areas are often referenced in PSPS reports as decision-making hubs for both PG&E
and local authorities.
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Figure 3.1. PG&E Geographic Boundaries. PG&E divides their service terri-
tory (black outline) into operating areas based on a hierarchical structures.
Regions (left), the largest areas, are split into divisions (middle). Divisions
are further split into districts (right), the smallest areas. The numbers in
parentheses are the total number of each kind of area. Adapted from Pacific
Gas & Electric Company (2019h).
PG&E provides power to over four million service points in California (Pacific Gas &
Electric Company 2019j). The location of these is shown in Figure 3.2 at the square-
mile resolution. Knowing the location of customers is necessary for utility companies to
identify the demands and risks present in a region. The distribution of customers across
the service territory is not uniform. There are both sparsely and densely populated areas
which have different energy demands. The terrain and vegetation around customers also
differs. Customers may be in very urban areas with little vegetation, or they may be in areas
interspersed or adjacent to heavily vegetated areas. The latter of these is theWUI, defined by
the Forest Service as “any area where humans and their development meet or intermix with
wildland fuel” (Stein et al. 2013). One example of this is the North Bay region surrounding
Napa (Figure 3.3). This area consists of pockets of densely populated areas overlapping with
or directly adjacent to HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 zones. Customers in these areas are not only
at risk of naturally-ignited wildfires, but are also especially prone to utility-ignited fires.
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Figure 3.2. PG&E Customers Across Service Territory. Customer data is
available at the square mile resolution. A close up of the Bay Area and
Santa Cruz Mountains is shown to illustrate the range in customer density.
Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019j).
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Figure 3.3. Wildland Urban Interface. The WUI is an area where human
development is adjacent to or coincides with wildfire-prone areas. The map
shows part of the North Bay area around Napa. PG&E services densely
populated areas (shown in dark blue) in areas that overlap with Tier 2 and
Tier 3 HFTD areas. Not only does this mean electric lines must traverse
wildfire-prone areas, but it also means that large groups of people are in
danger of potential wildfires. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company
(2019j) and California Public Utilities Commission (2020).
The electric power grid operates on three levels: (1) generation, (2) transmission, and (3)
distribution. The network of generation plants, transmission lines, and distribution circuits
must have the capacity to reach all customers in all areas. In simplest terms, the flow
of electric power starts at one of the natural gas/oil, coal, nuclear, or renewable energy
generation plants that PG&E wholly or partially owns (an example is shown in Figure 3.4).
It is then carried across the state via transmission lines, and finally to homes and businesses
on distribution circuits.
This thesis does not consider data on the generation sector, as it is not directly relevant to
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PSPS events. The transmission and distribution sectors are described in greater detail in the
following sections.
Figure 3.4. Moss Landing Power Plant. The natural gas powered electricity
plant located in Moss Landing is an example of one of the many generation
plants in the state of California utilized by PG&E. The satellite map (left)
shows where the transmission lines start. Some of the areas they carry electric
power to are Santa Cruz to the north and Monterey/Salinas to the south.
(left) Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019a). (right) Source:
Google Maps and Wikipedia (2020).
Transmission
PG&E operates 2,356 transmission lines across its service territory (Pacific Gas & Electric
Company 2019a). These high-voltage overhead lines traverse miles of HFTD Tier 2 and
Tier 3 zones. PG&E ranks individual circuits in terms of wildfire ignition risk. The utility
company calculates a risk score that is composed of multiple sub-scores based on wildfire,
capacity, reliability, PSPS events, and safety (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019a). The
scores assigned to each transmission line are shown in Figure 3.5. A low numeric score
for transmission lines corresponds to a low cardinal rank score—the transmission line with
rank one is considered the highest wildfire risk asset by the utility company. The minimum
and maximum risk scores are 81 and 1450, respectively. The number of lines classified
which are considered high-risk (shown in purple in Figure 3.5) are relatively few in number,
but make up a large proportion of the total transmission line-miles.
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Figure 3.5. Electric Transmission. The map on the left shows all PG&E-
operated transmission lines colored by risk score. The plots show the distri-
bution of risk scores (top right) and their relationship to the rank assigned
by PG&E (bottom right). The scoring scheme for transmission risk assigns
lower numerical values to higher risk assets. The lowest rank (lowest score)
corresponds to the highest risk asset. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric
Company (2019a) and California Public Utilities Commission (2020).
Distribution
PG&E operates 3,390 distribution circuits across its service territory (Pacific Gas&Electric
Company 2019a). Similar to the risk quantification for transmission lines, a scoring scheme
is used to rank individual distribution circuits in terms of wildfire ignition risk. The scores
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assigned to each distribution circuit are shown in Figure 3.6.A high risk score for distribution
circuits corresponds to a low cardinal rank score—the distribution circuit with rank one
is considered the highest wildfire risk asset by the utility company. The minimum and
maximum risk scores are 0 and 53.4, respectively.
Figure 3.6. Electric Distribution. The map on the left shows all PG&E-
operated distribution lines colored by risk score. The plots show the distri-
bution of risk scores (top right) and their relationship to the rank assigned
by PG&E (bottom right). The scoring scheme for distribution risk assigns
higher numerical values to higher risk assets. The lowest rank (highest score)
corresponds to the highest risk asset. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric
Company (2019a) and California Public Utilities Commission (2020).
One of the factors that contributes to a high risk score is the presence of vegetation in close
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proximity to overhead lines. Distribution circuits crossing through HFTD zones, especially
longer stretches of lines, tend to be at greater risk for this reason. Figure 3.7 shows the
spread of the proportion of HFTD miles per distribution circuit (Pacific Gas & Electric
Company 2019f). Although the majority of circuits are entirely outside of HFTD zones, the
next single largest group of circuits is almost entirely inside of HFTD zones (a proportion of
at least 0.9). Approximately 25% of all distribution circuits are partially inside Tier 2 or Tier
3 areas. Among the circuits in the HFTD, PG&E provides a separate risk score based only
on vegetation. Figure 3.8 shows this score for 687 circuits in the power grid. The average
score for the 392 circuits in Tier 2 regions is 0.0081. The average score for the 295 circuits
in Tier 3 regions is 0.0724.
Figure 3.7. Distribution Circuit-mile Composition. Circuits with proportion 0
of HFTD-miles are entirely outside of any HFTD areas. Circuits with propor-
tion 1 of HFTD-miles are entirely inside of any HFTD areas. Circuits with
proportions between 0 and 1 have spans both inside and outside of HFTD
areas. Adapted from (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019f).
PG&E also considers reliability in its wildfire ignition risk score. Figure 3.9 shows the
distribution of failure probabilities for a subset of distribution circuits (Pacific Gas &
Electric Company 2019k). The failure probabilities represent the projected likelihood of
target asset failure in the next year.
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Figure 3.8. Vegetation Risk Score. The map shows the vegetation risk score
for circuits in the HFTD shaded from light green (low risk) to dark green
(high risk). The plot show the distribution of risk scores for Tier 2 and Tier
3 regions within the HFTD. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company
(2019a) and California Public Utilities Commission (2020).
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Figure 3.9. Failure Probability for Distribution Circuits. PG&E has provided
failure probabilities for 789 distribution circuits. This probability represents
the projected likelihood of the target asset failing in the next year. Adapted
from (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019k).
It is useful to examine groups of distribution circuits that may be interconnected in the same
region or division. Table 3.2 shows aggregate statistics for circuits at the division-level.
The total mileage in HFTD zones and the average wildfire ignition risk score can indicate
divisions and regions that are at a higher wildfire risk and more likely to be involved in a
PSPS
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Table 3.2. Summary of Distribution Characteristics. Aggregate statistics are
shown by division for PG&E-operated distribution lines. A low risk score
corresponds to assets which are considered less of a risk with respect to
wildfires. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019a) and Pacific
Gas & Electric Company (2019h).
Risk Score
# Circuits Total HFTD-miles Min. Avg. Max.
Region Division
Bay Area Diablo 146 276.12 0 16.3 41.7
East Bay 242 293.45 0 8.7 45.9
North Bay 98 827.58 0 18.0 50.2
San Francisco 277 0 0 6.5 33.5
Central Coast Central Coast 150 1,355.01 0 12.2 38.2
De Anza 149 607.27 0 10.6 47.5
Los Padres 89 1,833.65 0 13.5 31.5
Mission 152 248.64 0 14.0 48.4
Peninsula 218 433.20 0 10.8 45.9
San Jose 158 307.23 0 10.9 49.7
Central Valley Fresno 338 821.43 0 7.6 33.9
Kern 244 122.97 0 6.1 29.8
Stockton 201 1,488.82 0 11.7 52.7
Yosemite 181 3,148.28 0 12.2 47.3
Northern Humboldt 104 3,156.97 0.7 27.7 44.1
North Valley 161 3,756.25 0.2 17.8 48.1
Sacramento 147 152.07 0 9.8 36.8
Sierra 172 5,056.39 0.7 20.2 53.0
Sonoma 93 1,624.07 0.0 24.1 53.4
3.2.2 Past Ignition Events
This section examines data for 2,451 ignition events from 2015-2019, as illustrated in
Figure 3.10. The data covers ignition characteristics, such as location, area burned, causes,
and equipment involved. Many of these characteristics contain a significant amount of
missing values, which we indicate in subsequent figures and tables.
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Figure 3.10. Ignition Events by Year. The number shown in the bottom left
corner of each map represents the total number of ignition events in the
given year. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019g).
Figure 3.11 shows that utility-caused ignitions can occur in a variety of locations depending
on the type of line, as well as the terrain and materials surrounding a line. Figure 3.12 shows
ignitions on both transmission and distribution lines in two distinct areas of California.
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Figure 3.11. Proportion of Ignition Events by Location. Adapted from Pacific
Gas & Electric Company (2019g).
Figure 3.12. Ignition Events on Power Lines. Ignition events can occur on
both transmission and distribution lines. The Sierra Foothills area (upper
left) has a relatively sparse distribution network. The Santa Cruz Mountains
area (bottom left) has a relatively dense distribution. In both regions, many
more ignition events have occurred at the distribution level, rather than
transmission. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019g) and
Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019a).
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Ignitions on utility equipment have the potential to start wildfires of varying sizes. Fig-
ure 3.13 shows the proportion of ignition events by the total area burned (fire size). PG&E
provides fire size as a categorical (rather than numeric) variable in this data set. Several of
the original categories were ambiguous and overlapping; we cleaned the data and combined
categories enough so that they would be easily interpreted. Fire size is primarily given as
an area (in acres). For measurements given in meters, we assume the fire was contained to
the power line.
Figure 3.13. Total Burned Area. The plot shows the distribution of final
burned area for utility-ignited fires from 2015 to 2019. The fire size appears
in increasing order from bottom to top. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric
Company (2019g).
Additionally, ignitions can lead to outages either due to damaged equipment or in response
to a spreading fire. Of the ignitions in this data set, 88.5% resulted in some form of customer
outage. Figure 3.14 shows the distribution of outage durations.
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Figure 3.14. Outage Duration. The plot shows the distribution of customer-
hours of a power outage that resulted from a utility-ignited fire. Adapted
from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019g).
Many different malfunctions, failures, or unexpected events can create ignitions on electrical
equipment (Table 3.3). The root cause of an ignition often depends on the type of electrical
equipment (Table 3.4), associated voltage (Table 3.5), and the weather conditions. The
majority of ignition events did not involve a wire-down incident (Table 3.6), although they
often coincided with weather warnings (Table 3.7).
Table 3.3. Ignition Initiating Event. The table shows the proportion of total
ignitions caused by various events. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric
Company (2019g).
contact from object 0.451






third party equipment on pole > 0.001
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Table 3.4. Type of Electrical Equipment. The table shows the counts of
electrical equipment cross-tabulated by the kind of structure (overhead,
padmounted, or subsurface) and the specific asset involved with ignition.
Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019g).
Overhead Padmounted Subsurface N.A. Totals
capacitor bank 49 0 0 0 49
conductor 1707 0 5 0 1712
fuse 36 0 0 0 36
lightning arrestor 20 0 0 0 20
switch 8 0 2 0 10
transformer 60 2 3 0 65
other 59 1 1 0 61
N.A. 32 0 1 465 498
Totals 1971 3 12 465 2451
Table 3.5. Ignition Events by Voltage of Equipment. The table shows the pro-
portion of ignition events either in the distribution sections (left) or transmis-
















Table 3.6. Ignition Events by Wire-Down
Incident. The table shows the proportion
of ignition events where a wire down inci-
dent occurred. Adapted from Pacific Gas




Table 3.7. Ignition Events by Weather
Warning. The table shows the proportion
of ignition events where a fire weather
warning was present. Adapted from Pa-




The final burned area of an ignition may depends on how it was sparked. Table 3.8 shows
the relative proportion of distribution voltages responsible for fires of different sizes. For
example, of the largest fires (larger than 5,000 acres) caused by distribution circuits, all were
ignited on distribution lines carrying 12,000 Volts.
Table 3.8. Distribution Voltage Associated with Fire Size. The table shows
the number of ignition events started at a particular voltage (column) for the
given fire size (row). Blank entries represent zeroes. Adapted from Pacific
Gas & Electric Company (2019g).
Voltage ≤750 4,000 12,000 17,000 21,000 Distribution (other) Total
structure only 23 2 31 3 9 4 72
1 meter - < 3 meters 162 2 274 9 54 100 601
3 meters - 0.25 acres 168 168
< 0.25 acres 201 1 543 18 143 9 915
0.25 - 10 acres 35 1 223 16 68 107 450
10 - 100 acres 4 37 2 14 15 72
100+ acres 2 2
100 - 299 acres 7 1 8
300 - 999 acres 1 4 1 6
1,000 - 4,999 acres 1 2 3
> 5,000 acres 8 8
N.A. 18 18
Total 427 6 1129 48 290 423 2323
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Table 3.9 shows similar results for transmission lines.
Table 3.9. Transmission Voltage Associated with Fire Size. The table shows
the number of ignition events started at a particular voltage (column) for the
given fire size (row). Blank entries represent zeroes. Adapted from Pacific
Gas & Electric Company (2019g).
Voltage 60,000 70,000 115,000 230,000 Transmission (other) Total
structure only 1 1 2
1 meter - < 3 meters 1 1 3 4 9
3 meters - 0.25 acres 2 2
< 0.25 acres 11 9 13 4 37
0.25 - 10 acres 17 5 11 5 38
10 - 100 acres 4 3 5 1 2 15
100+ acres 1 1
100 - 299 acres
300 - 999 acres 1 1 2
1,000 - 4,999 acres 1 1
> 5,000 acres 1 1
N.A. 12 12
Total 35 20 33 5 27 120
Table 3.10 shows that, regardless of fire size, overhead equipment is the most prevalent
kind of equipment for ignitions, which is the primary risk concern for PSPS events. In most
cases, conductors or capacitors were the source of ignitions, although for the largest fires it
is unknown (Table 3.11).
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Table 3.10. Structure Type Associated with Fire Size. The table shows the
number of ignition events started on a particular structure type (column)
for the given fire size (row). Blank entries represent zeroes. Adapted from
Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019g).
Structure Type Overhead Padmounted Subsurface N.A. Total
structure only 66 3 5 74
1 meter - < 3 meters 502 2 2 104 610
3 meters - 0.25 acres 170 170
< 0.25 acres 937 1 5 9 952
0.25 - 10 acres 374 2 112 488
10 - 100 acres 70 17 87
100+ acres 3 3
100 - 299 acres 8 8
300 - 999 acres 8 8
1,000 - 4,999 acres 4 4
> 5000 acres 2 7 9
N.A. 30 30
Total 1971 3 12 457 2443
Table 3.11. Equipment Type Associated with Fire Size. The table shows the
number of ignition events started on a particular structure type (column)
for the given fire size (row). Blank entries represent zeroes. Adapted from





switch transformer other N.A.
Total
bank arrestor
structure only 61 1 2 5 5 74
1 meter - < 3 meters 21 415 12 7 3 28 14 110 610
3 meters - 0.25 acres 170 170
< 0.25 acres 22 810 17 9 4 21 41 28 952
0.25 - 10 acres 6 337 6 4 1 9 5 120 488
10 - 100 acres 68 2 17 87
100+ acres 3 3
100 - 299 acres 8 8
300 - 999 acres 8 8
1,000 - 4,999 acres 3 1 4
> 5,000 acres 2 7 9
N.A. 30 30
Total 49 1712 36 20 10 65 61 490 2443
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The final burned area may also depend on how easily the fire is able to spread. Most mid-
to large-size fires were ignited near vegetation, while smaller fires ignited around other
materials (Table 3.12).
Table 3.12. Ignition Materials Associated with Fire Size. The table shows the
number of ignition events started by a particular material (column) for the
given fire size (row). Blank entries represent zeroes. Adapted from Pacific
Gas & Electric Company (2019g).
Material at Origin Vegetation Building Other N.A. Total
structure only 3 42 24 5 74
1 meter - < 3 meters 500 6 104 610
3 meters - 0.25 acres 170 170
< 0.25 acres 937 1 5 9 952
0.25 - 10 acres 375 1 112 488
10 - 100 acres 69 1 17 87
100+ acres 3 3
100 - 299 acres 8 8
300 - 999 acres 8 8
1,000 - 4,999 acres 4 4
> 5,000 acres 2 7 9
N.A. 30 30
Total 1906 44 36 457 2443
Similarly, most mid- to large-size fires were ignited in rural areas, while smaller fires were
often ignited in urban areas (Table 3.13). Weather warnings, which are related to wind and
temperature, were often not present during past ignition events (Table 3.14). In fact, they
were rarely present for fires smaller than 5,000 acres.
52
Table 3.13. Land Use Associated with Fire Size. The table shows the number
of ignition events that occurred in rural or urban areas (column) for the given
fire size (row). Blank entries represent zeroes. Adapted from Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (2019g).
Land Use Rural Urban N.A. Total
structure only 25 44 5 74
1 meter - < 3 meters 339 167 104 610
3 meters - 0.25 acres 170 170
< 0.25 acres 755 188 9 952
0.25 - 10 acres 349 27 112 488
10 - 100 acres 69 1 17 87
100+ acres 3 3
100 - 299 acres 8 8
300 - 999 acres 8 8
1000 - 4999 acres 4 4
> 5000 acres 2 7 9
N.A. 30 30
Total 1559 427 457 2443
Table 3.14. Weather Warning Associated with Fire Size. The table shows
the number of ignition events started with a fire weather warning present
(column) for the given fire size (row). Blank entries represent zeroes. Adapted
from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019g).
Weather Warning Yes No N.A. Total
structure only 4 65 5 74
1 meter - < 3 meters 34 472 104 610
3 meters - 0.25 acres 170 170
< 0.25 acres 96 847 9 952
0.25 - 10 acres 47 329 112 488
10 - 100 acres 7 63 17 87
100+ acres 3 3
100 - 299 acres 8 8
300 - 999 acres 1 7 8
1000 - 4999 acres 1 3 4
> 5000 acres 7 2 9
N.A. 30 30
Total 197 1796 450 2443
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Once a fire has started and been detected, several agencies could lead the suppression efforts
(Figure 3.15). For fires larger than 0.25 acres, a state or local fire agency always manages
fire suppression. For smaller fires, although fire agencies handle the majority of cases, it is
also possible for other organizations to be involved.
Table 3.15. Fire Suppression. The table shows the proportion of ignition








One way PG&E quantifies wildfire risk for overhead transmission lines is using a likelihood
of ignition (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019a). The probabilities are provided at
approximately 30,000 points along the transmission grid, which represent transmission
poles carrying high-voltage lines (Pacific Gas & Electric Company 2019a). Data is only
provided for a subset of transmission poles in the power grid, primarily for those that are
within Tier 2 or Tier 3 zones (Figure 3.15). The distribution of ignition probabilities is
shown in Figure 3.16. There are low and high probabilities both inside and outside of the
HFTD.
This data is the product of a Bayesian model that considers the age of the structure, type
of material, location, loading, corrosion, and other characteristics of transmission poles to
create a failure curve (Thalman 2020). This curve considers failures that result in ignitions
at certain wind speeds. The ignition probability values in Figures 3.15 and 3.16 represent a
single point along this failure curve at 80 mph winds (Thalman 2020). Based on information
in the 2019 PSPS reports, 80 mph winds are rare within PG&E’s service territory and are
much stronger than the wind forecasts that may trigger a PSPS event (Pacific Gas & Electric
Company 2019e). Typically, forecasted sustained winds of 20-30 mph and gusts of 35-45
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mph are enough to consider holding a power shutoff event (Pacific Gas & Electric Company
2019e). Observed wind speeds during an event tend to range from 30-60 mph. Only two
of the eight shutoff events in 2019 observed winds over 70 mph (Pacific Gas & Electric
Company 2019e).
Figure 3.15. Ignition Risk on Transmission Lines. The map shows the prob-
ability of ignition (over a year), given that 80 mph wind gusts are present at
points along transmission lines. Each of these points represents a utility pole
carrying a high-voltage line and is colored based on the likelihood of igni-
tion. The Monterey area (bottom left) has spans of transmission that have
low probability of ignition; this can be considered a low-risk area for starting
wildfires. The Humboldt coast area (top left) has spans of transmission that
have high probability of ignition; this can be considered a high-risk area for
starting wildfires. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019a)
and California Public Utilities Commission (2020).
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Figure 3.16. Distribution of Ignition Probabilities. These histograms show the
probability of ignition on transmission poles for all poles (top) and by HFTD-
class (bottom). The horizontal axis shows the likelihood and the vertical axis
shows the number of poles. The total number of poles considered in each
histogram is shown in the top right of the given plot. Adapted from Pacific
Gas & Electric Company (2019a) and California Public Utilities Commission
(2020).
3.2.4 Weather
Weather plays a large role not in only in determining when to hold a PSPS, but also in
identifying high-risk areas for future planning. PG&E utilizes weather stations across the
service territory to monitor wind speeds that could pose a threat to electric equipment or
heighten wildfire risk (Figure 3.17). When a weather station detects winds above a certain
threshold speed, it triggers a wind alert system. This alerts PG&E decision-makers to areas
that should be closely monitored for more severe weather.
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Figure 3.17. PG&E Wind Speed Thresholds. PG&E utilizes weather stations
across the state to monitor wind speeds. Each point on the map is a weather
station that can measure wind speeds. When gusts above a certain speed are
present at a station, a wind alert is triggered for the utility company. The
thresholds for alerts are rule-based, determined based on the elevation of the
weather station. Each point is colored according to the minimum wind speed
(mph) for triggering an alert. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company
(2019i).
A RFW present in a county, issued by the NWS, can used as one of the deciding factors for
considering a PSPS event. Historical data indicates that some counties are more prone to
RFW than others (Figure 3.18).
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Figure 3.18. Red Flag Warnings. The maps show California’s counties shaded
by the number of Red Flag Warnings that occurred in a given county in a
given year. The counties with the most RFW days each year were Siskiyou
(2015), Kern (2016), Siskiyou (2017), Shasta (2018), and Shasta (2019).
Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019f).
.
3.2.5 PSPS Events
Every PSPS is unique. The regions affected, lines de-energized, and number of customers
involved can all vary (Table 3.16). Of the eight shutoff events in 2019, we observe the
following:
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• the minimum duration was 16 hours,
• the minimum number of de-energized distribution lines was 17,
• the minimum number of de-energized transmission lines was 7,
• there were at minimum 11,609 total customers affected, and
• there were at minimum 173,816 customer-hours of outage.
In seven of the eight PSPS events, PG&E de-energized lines in the Sierra Foothills area.
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Table 3.16. Summary of 2019 PSPS Events. This table describes each PSPS
event over the course of 2019. The Areas Affected follows the naming con-
vention used in the PSPS reports to the CPUC. Data on customers is calcu-
lated from the number PG&E service points on a particular circuit. Adapted
from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2020a).
# Lines De-energized










Jun. 8 - 9 North Bay, Sierra Foothills 36 22 8 22,467 369,186
Sep. 23 - 24 North Bay, Sierra Foothills 47 18 10 21,720 502,185
Sep. 25 - 26 North Bay, Sierra Foothills 32 44 13 49,100 813,841
Oct. 5 - 6 Sierra Foothills 16 17 7 11,609 173,816
Oct. 9 - 12 Central Coast, East Bay, North Bay,
Sacramento
90 424 79 673,024 32,910,701
Oct. 23 - 25 Bay Area, North Bay, Sierra Foothills 52 140 26 172,644 5,361,908
Oct. 26 - Nov. 1
North Bay, Sierra Foothills, Santa Cruz
128 641 31 876,696 66,178,520
Mountains, North Coast, Humboldt
Nov. 20 - 21
North Bay, Napa Valley,
39 57 7 49,202 1,373,290
Sierra Foothills, Shasta
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Once lines are de-energized, the duration of the outage can vary widely, as shown in Figure
3.19. Differences in duration occur not only across different events, but also across circuits
in the same event. Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD zones can have much longer outages compared
to non-HFTD areas.
Figure 3.19. Duration of PSPS Events. These histograms show the distribu-
tion of duration times (A) for all 2019 PSPS events, (B) by PSPS event, and
(C) by HFTD class. The horizontal axis shows the estimated duration time
in hours, and the vertical axis shows the proportion of circuits exhibiting a
given duration. The total number of circuits considered is shown as N in the




We synthesize data on the power-restoration process using two sources: (1) GIS files for
individual PSPS events provided in the WMP and (2) the PSPS reports to the CPUC.
The GIS files for each power shutdown contain attribute tables with information on each
de-energized circuit in the given event. The relevant columns are the event start time (i.e.
the date-time the circuit was de-energized), CBC0AC , and the total duration of the event (i.e. the
length of time the circuit was de-enegrized), ΔC>DC04. We use these two values to calculate
the end time for the outage (i.e. the date-time the circuit was re-energized), C4=3 , as shown
in Equation 3.1:
CBC0AC + ΔC>DC04 = C4=3 . (3.1)
The post-PSPS reports to the CPUC contained information on the date-time the restoration
process began for a particular PSPS event. While the GIS files provide data at the circuit
level, the reports provide information at a broader geographic scale. Estimates for the start
of the restoration process are given for regions or phases of the event. Many of the utility
shutdowns in 2019 were conducted across different districts within the PG&E service
territory and in multiple time phases. For example, the PSPS on November 20 - 21 was
planned across 10 districts in 5 separate time phases (Pacific Gas & Electric Company
2019c). For each PSPS event, we chose to use the earliest time provided in the reports as
the start time of the restoration process for all circuits involved in the event. To calculate
the duration of the restoration process, CA4BC for each circuit, ΔCA4BC , we used the estimated
start time of restoration and the previously calculated end time of the event, C4=3 , as shown
in Equation 3.2:
C4=3 − CA4BC = ΔCA4BC . (3.2)
Applying this heuristic across all PSPS events produced the distribution of restoration times
shown in Figure 3.20. It is important to note there are negative values for restoration times
for some power shutoffs, which is not realistic. This is a direct result of the way we chose
to calculate these times; we were limited by incomplete information for multi-stage events
in the reports to the CPUC. Similar to the outage duration times, the restoration times also
vary greatly across events and between circuits in the same event. Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD
62
zones may take much longer to restore power to compared to non-HFTD areas.
Figure 3.20. Restoration Duration for PSPS Events. These histograms show
the distribution for the calculated restoration times (A) for all 2019 PSPS
events, (B) by PSPS event, and (C) by HFTD class. The horizontal axis
shows the estimated restoration time in hours, and the vertical axis shows
the proportion of circuits exhibiting a given duration. The total number of
circuits considered is shown as N in the upper right corner of each histogram.
Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2020a).
PSPS Impact
The impact of PSPS events can be viewed and measured from three different perspectives:
(1) customers affected, (2) economic cost, and (3) wildfire risk reduction.
PG&E has two metrics for the impact of PSPS events on utility customers: (1) the total
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number of customer service points and (2) the total customer-hours of power outage, both
provided at the individual circuit level.
In addition to reporting the total number of customer service points on de-energized distri-
bution circuits, PG&E breaks this figure down by customer type (Table 3.17). Customers
can be residential, medical baseline, commercial industrial, or not fall into any of these cat-
egories (other). Each of these groups of customers can present a different kind of economic
or social loss for the utility company and the community when a power shutdown occurs.
Table 3.17. Number of De-energized Customers for 2019 PSPS Events.
PG&E counts customers as the number of service points on a distribution
circuit. The table shows the proportion of each type of customer and the to-
tal customers for the PSPS. Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company
(2020a).
# Customers
Residential Medical Baseline Commercial Industrial Other Total
Jun. 8 - 9 0.82 0.07 0.11 0.01 24,038
Sep. 23 - 24 0.85 0.06 0.07 0.01 23,146
Sep. 25 - 26 0.84 0.06 0.10 0.001 52,084
Oct. 5 - 6 0.83 0.06 0.10 0.01 12,339
Oct. 9 - 12 0.86 0.04 0.10 0.01 765,706
Oct. 23 - 25 0.85 0.04 0.10 0.01 186,748
Oct. 26 - Nov. 1 0.85 > 0.01 0.10 0.01 1,003,657
Nov. 20 - 21 0.82 0.05 0.10 0.03 51,634
The customer-hours of outage,  , is the product of the number of customers without
power, # , and the PSPS duration, ΔC>DC04, as shown in Equation 3.3. The distribution of
customer-hours for each event is given by Equation 3.3:
# ∗ ΔC>DC04 =  (3.3)
and shown in Figure 3.21.
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Figure 3.21. Customer-Hours of Outage. These histograms show the dis-
tribution for the calculated customer-hours of outage by PSPS event. The
horizontal axis shows the customer-hours and the vertical axis shows the
proportion of circuits exhibiting a given value. Adapted from Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (2020a).
Figure 3.22 shows each of these three variables as map layers. The duration map (Hours of
Outage) and customer map (Customers on Circuit) can be overlaid to create the customer-
hours map. Customer-hours serves as a more descriptive impact measure than either of
its component layers, but all three are needed to understand the outcome. To illustrate
this, we compare the first two power shutdowns in 2019, on June 8-9 and September 23-
25. Both events were executed in the same geographic areas and comparable distribution
and transmission assets were de-energized—22 and 18 distribution circuits, and 8 and 10
transmission lines, respectively for the June and September events. Although the September
outage lasted approximately 11 hours longer than the June outage, the June outage affected
approximately 750 more customers than the September outage. Overall, the later PSPS
event exceeded the earlier event by approximately 13,000 customer-hours, or a factor of 1.4.
From only the duration statistics, we would conclude that the September outage was a larger
disruption; from only the customer statistics, we would conclude that the June outage was
the larger disruption; from only the customer-hours statistics, we would conclude that the
September outage was the larger disruption. However, when we look at all three, the answer
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is not as clear and can be subjective.
Figure 3.22. Customer-Hours Map. Impact measures for the Nov. 20 – 21
power shutoff are shown for de-energized circuits. The customer-hours of
outage (right) is a product of the total hours of outage for each circuit (left)
and the total number of customers (middle). Adapted from Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (2020a).
In addition the direct impact on utility customers, power shutoff events have economic
implications for both customers and electric power providers. During a PSPS event, there is
the potential for electric power demand to fall below supply— this lost load has an associated
economic cost. A power outage is also potentially time when a customer is paying for a
service they are not receiving, or when the utility company is absorbing the cost of this.
We conduct a similar analysis toWolfram (2019). In Figure 3.23, we estimate the megawatts
(MWs) of lost load during a PSPS by comparing power usage in California during a 2019
shutoff event and during the corresponding time frame in 2018. We looked at the week of
October 7 (Monday) to October 12 (Sunday) in 2019 and October 8 (Monday) to October
13 (Sunday) in 2018. PG&E held a PSPS event starting October 9 and ending October 12
(2019). We did not identify any large power outages that occurred in the corresponding
week in 2018. During the PSPS event, the MWs of power delivered in 2018 exceeds that
of 2019 (Figure 3.23). Before and after the outage begins, there is either a comparable load
delivered between the two years, or 2019 demand exceeds 2018 demand (Figure 3.23). A
similar trend was observed when conducting this analysis for all 2019 PSPS events.
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Figure 3.23. Lost Load During a PSPS. The time series plot (top) shows
the MWs of electric power delivered at 5-minute intervals in parts of the
state covered by the CAISO. The bar chart (bottom) shows the average
instantaneous MWs of power delivered for each day of a PSPS. Lines/bars in
blue reflect demand during the week of a PSPS event in 2019, and lines/bars
in gray reflect demand for the corresponding week in 2018. The data reflects
the Oct. 9 - Oct. 12 PSPS event. Adapted from California Independent
System Operator (2020).
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One of the key decisions utility operators must make when considering a PSPS is where to
shut off power. De-energizing lines in a particular area significantly decreases the chance
of an ignition occurring, but energized portions of the electric grid are still at risk. Thus,
ignitions can and have occurred during past PSPS events. Table 3.18 shows the counts and
fire sizes of ignition events that occurred in the same time frame as the 2019 PSPS events.
Table 3.18. Ignitions Occurring During PSPS Events. The table shows the
number of utility-caused ignitions that sparked during a PSPS event any-
where in the utility service territory, along with largest size of resulting fires.
Adapted from Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019g) and Pacific Gas &
Electric Company (2019a).
PSPS Event # Ignitions Size
Jun. 8 - 9 11 ≤ 0.25 acres
Sep. 23 - 24 5 ≤ 10 acres
Sep. 25 - 26 5 ≤ 10 acres
Oct. 5 - 6 3 ≤ 10 acres
Oct. 9 - 12 8 ≤ 10 acres
Oct. 23 - 25 6 ≤ 10 acres
Oct. 26 - Nov. 1 46 < 100 acres
Nov. 20 - 21 3 ≤ 10 acres
Figure 3.24 shows the location of ignitions for the September 25 shutoff event. For this
particular event, some of the ignitions occurred relatively near the areas that were targeted
for de-energization, while others occurred in areas that were not considered. All of the
ignitions that occurred during this event were outside of the HFTD.
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Figure 3.24. Ignition Sites During a PSPS. This figure shows eight ignition
sites that occurred during the September 25 shutoff event. The ignitions
boxed in yellow resulted in the largest fires among the eight. PG&E classifies
these in the size range from 0.25 acres to 10 acres. Adapted from Pacific Gas
& Electric Company (2019g) and Pacific Gas & Electric Company (2019a).
3.3 Discussion
We gain several insights from this exploratory data analysis.
Overhead power lines are the main source of wildfire risk in the electric power grid. Risk
can vary greatly between individual assets in the both the transmission and distribution grid
based on geographic location, vegetation management, and equipment condition.
Utility-caused ignitions commonly occur on distribution lines in rural areas with vegetation
near the sight of ignition. Ignitions are most often caused by contact from foreign objects
or equipment failure. Many other factors can be associated with utility-caused ignitions,
including geographic location, voltage, outages, and equipment type. Although most igni-
tions result in fires that burn less than 0.25 acres, they have the potential to grow larger than
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5,000 acres.
Past PSPS events can vary widely in scope in terms of duration, restoration times, number
of customers affected, and lost electric load. Many of the key decisions in executing a power
shutoff involve meteorological data on wind and humidity.
The descriptive analysis in this chapter sets the stage for another kind of model: predictive.
We can use the data described—on ignitions, weather, the electric power grid, and past





This chapter explores methods to analyze the characteristics of de-energized circuits, the
fire size of an ignition, and the social cost of PSPS events.
4.1 Characteristics of De-energization
In this section, we build three models— logistic regression, classification tree, and random
forest— to answer two questions. Given that critical PSPS weather conditions are present
in an area can we
1. Identify important variables that determine which circuits are shut off?
2. Predict which circuits are shut off?
The answer to the first question provides insight into PG&E’s decision-making process. In
this thesis, we assume that the data PG&Eprovides (such as that in Chapter 3) serves a role in
the planning and execution of a power shutoff.Aside fromweather conditions,we do not have
the details of how PG&E uses information relating to terrain or the properties of the power
grid. Building regression and classificationmodels allows us to identify important variables.
The second question allows us to validate the results of the first question by “recreating”
past PSPS events. This analysis is conducted using the R Programming Language (R Core
Team 2020) using the glm, rpart, and randomForest libraries.
4.1.1 Data Description
For this analysis, we combined data on the electric distribution grid (see Section 3.2.1) and
on past PSPS events (see Section 3.2.5). We subset this data to include circuits within 41
(of 47) of PG&E’s administrative districts. These districts were chosen such that at least
one circuit within the district had been part of a PSPS event in 2019.The intent is to ensure
that we are not including areas that had never been considered for a power shutoff and are
unlikely to be considered for one in the future.
The metadata on distributions circuits consists of 14 explanatory variables on line-mileage,
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reliability measures, vegetation, and risk scores. We omit the following:
• Location variables: These variables indicate the region, division, and district that each
circuit falls within. For this analysis, we chose to focus on variables that are inherent
properties of the distribution lines. Including location variables was also likely to
skew our results because some districts experience multiple PSPS events in 2019, and
thus appear significantly more often than others;
• Redundant variables: Several of the line-mileage variables were linearly dependent or
highly correlated with each other. We chose to only keep a subset of these variables
to avoid collinearity issues;
• Variables with too many missing values: We kept only those variables that had values
for at least half of all observations.We did this to ensure there would be a large enough
sample size to conduct analysis on.
We reduce the predictor space to six explanatory variables: circuit risk score (numeric);
total line miles (numeric); proportion of HFTD, Zone 1, Tier 2 miles, and Tier 3 miles
(numeric); and whether the circuit is within the HFTD (binary). The response is a binary
variable indicating whether or not a particular circuit was part at least one PSPS event in
2019.
The final subset of data covers 2,345 distribution circuits. We split this data into a train and
test set consisting of approximately 90% (2,000 circuits) and 10% (189 circuits) of the data,
respectively (Figure 4.1). For the test set, we hold out three districts (Peninsula, Coast, and
Redding) where three separate PSPS events had occurred.
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Figure 4.1. Train/Test Data Split. This figure shows the breakdown between
train and test set for the de-energization characteristics analysis. Information
on the train and test sets is shown in blue and yellow, respectively.
4.1.2 Logistic Regression
A logistic regression is in the form of
? =
4[
1 + 4[ (4.1)
where [ is a linear combination of predictors, G8, such that
[ = V0 + V1G1 + · · · + V=G=. (4.2)
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For our analysis, the response variable, ?, represents the likelihood that a particular circuit
will be de-energized during a PSPS event. As an example a circuit with ? = 0.95 is very
likely to be de-energized, while ? = 0.05 is very unlikely to be de-energized.
We tried over 20 models and considered second-order polynomial terms for all numeric
variables and all two-way interactions between variables. In the model building process,
we utilized step-wise regression in the backward and forward direction, along with Akaike
information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to select variables.
To select the best model we calculate the ten-fold cross validated error on the training set
for each candidate model. We use a weighted error function (Equation 4.3) with a range of






|0(~8 == 0) ( ?̂8 ≥ \) + |1(~8 == 1) ( ?̂8 < \) (4.3)
Here, n is the cross-validated error, # is the number of observations/circuits, ~ indicates
whether a circuit was on (~ == 0) or off (~ == 1) during a PSPS, and ?̂ is the probability
the circuit is turned off (output from logistic regression). The first term in the summation
represents a false positive—we classify the circuit as de-energized, but it was left on during
the actual PSPS. The second term in the summation represents a false negative—we classify
the circuit as energized, but it was turned off during the actual PSPS.
We use a range of values for \ ∈ [0, 1] in increments of 0.05, and we use three sets of
weights — {|0 = |1 = 0.5}, {|0 = 0.75, |1 = 0.25}, and {|0 = 0.25, |1 = 0.75} — to
represent tradeoffs between the false positive and false negative rate. If a utility company
is willing to take on a higher false positive rate, then we consider them to take a more
conservative approach to power shutoffs— they tend to de-energize more circuits than
necessary to reduce wildfire risk.
As the best model, we chose the model that had the minimum cross-validated error in the
0.4 to 0.6 range for \ for all three sets of weights. The model took the form of
[ = −4.5 + 0.13G1 − 0.006G2 + 2.19{G3 == 1} (4.4)
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where G1 is the circuit risk score, G2 is the total line-mileage, and G3 == 1 indicates the
circuit is within the HFTD.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the performance of the best model on the test set.
Figure 4.2. Boxplot of Logistic Regression Prediction. The plot shows the
distribution of predicted probabilities (vertical axis) for the true class of
circuits (horizontal axis). The plot also differentiates between circuits that
experienced PSPS events 0, 1, or ≥ 1 times by color.
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Figure 4.3. Map of Logistic Regression Prediction. The left side shows which
circuits were de-energized in a PSPS (red), and the right side shows the
same circuits shaded by their likelihood to be shut off as predicted by the
logistic regression. The Peninsula and Coast districts are shown on top, and
the Redding district is shown on the bottom.
4.1.3 Classification Tree
We build a classification/decision tree that, similar to the logistic regression, outputs ?,
the likelihood that a particular circuit will be de-energized during a PSPS event. Using the
training set we use the Gini impurity index to grow the tree, and we prune the tree to one
standard error above the minimum classification error. The final tree is shown in Figure 4.4.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the predictive performance of the classification tree on the test set.
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Figure 4.4. Classification Tree. The two variables that are split on are: (1)
the proportion of total miles that fall within the HFTD and (2) the PG&E
risk score. The leaves show ?, the probability of a circuit that falls within
that category is de-energized during a PSPS event.
Figure 4.5. Boxplot of Classification Tree Prediction. The plot shows the
distribution of predicted probabilities (vertical axis) for the true class of
circuits (horizontal axis). The plot also differentiates between circuits that
experienced PSPS events 0, 1, or ≥ 1 times by color.
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Figure 4.6. Map of Classification Tree Prediction. The left side shows which
circuits were de-energized in a PSPS (red), and the right side shows the
same circuits shaded by their likelihood to be shut off as predicted by the
classification tree. The Peninsula and Coast districts are shown on top, and
the Redding district is shown on the bottom.
4.1.4 Random Forest
We build a RF that outputs ?, the likelihood that a particular circuit will be de-energized
during a PSPS event. The RF is built by calculating the out-of-bag error values. We build
200 trees that each split on two randomly chosen variables. The variable importance for the
RF is shown in Figure 4.7. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the predictive performance of the RF
on the test set.
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Figure 4.7. Variable Importance for Random Forest. Variable importance
(horizontal axis) is measured as the mean decrease in node impurity.
Figure 4.8. Boxplot of Random Forest Prediction. The plot shows the distri-
bution of predicted probabilities (vertical axis) for the true class of circuits
(horizontal axis). The plot also differentiates between circuits that experi-
enced PSPS events 0, 1, or ≥ 1 times by color.
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Figure 4.9. Map of Random Forest Prediction. The left side shows which
circuits were de-energized in a PSPS (red), and the right side shows the
same circuits shaded by their likelihood to be shut off as predicted by the
random forest. The Peninsula and Coast districts are shown on top, and the
Redding district is shown on the bottom.
4.1.5 Comparison of Methods
We compare the performance of the three models— logistic regression, classification tree,
and RF— in a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (Figure 4.10). This plot shows
the ability of a binary classifier to discriminate between classes as its threshold classification
probability is varied. Using the area under the curve (AUC) metric, we observe that all three
models have similar performance. The AUC is 0.974, 0.965, and 0.970 for the logistic, tree,
and RF models, respectively.
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Figure 4.10. Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve. This plot compares
the three modeling methods. All have similar performance based the area
under the curve.
Across all three models, variables relating to the HFTD are important in predicting the
likelihood of a circuit to be de-energized. More specifically, the binary HFTD variable is a
linear predictor in the logistic regression; the proportion of HFTD miles is a decision-split
for the classification tree; and the HFTD and Tier 2 proportions are the two most important
variables in the RF. The PG&E risk score is also influential in all three models.
4.2 Predicting Fire Size from Ignitions
For this analysis, we use the ignition data set described in Section 3.2.2. Our goal is to
conduct a similar analysis to Cortez and Morais (2007) to predict the size of a fire caused by
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a utility-ignition. Because the ignition data set provides the fire size as a categorical, rather
than a numeric variable, we build a classification tree and RF. However, these methods
are unsuccessful. Given the large amount of missing data and the unbalanced number of
observations within each fire size category (Figure 3.13), we are unable to build a useful
classifier. Based on the past research on wildfire modeling (Section 2.3.1) and this attempt
at an analysis, we would require a greater amount and potentially a different type of data to
conduct an analysis that would yield insightful results.
4.3 Estimating the Cost of a PSPS
Chapter 3 discusses the impact of a PSPS event in terms of the duration of an outage, the
number of customers without power, and the lost electric load. The next step is to ask: what
does this translate to in economic or social costs?
There is a vast literature on how to estimate the value of “lost” power during an electric
utility outage, but there is no single answer or method (U.S. Department of Energy 2017). It
is a challenging problem because not only are electric power consumption patterns complex,
but so are the human interactions that occur during outages (Sullivan et al. 2018). Building
an economic model to calculate the cost of power outages requires considering a number
of factors: the duration of an outage; the residential load; the small and large business load;
geographic location; how consumption varies based on weather, type of customer, time of
year, or time of day; and how prepared customers are for outages (e.g. advanced notification,
backup generators) (U.S. Department of Energy 2017).
In this section, we combine the results from large scale outage-cost studies, such as those
considered in Sullivan et al. (2018), and the data from 2019 PSPS events to provide an
estimate of the economic cost of each of these events. Our simple method provides a
baseline for understanding the socioeconomic losses associated with PG&E’s intentional
power shutoffs and how they compare to those of wildfires.
4.3.1 Method
We consider three values: (1) customer-hours of outage, (2) average electric consumption,
and (3) cost per unserved Kilowatt-hour (kWh).
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We refer to customer-hours of outage as  . This data is available for each PSPS event for
both residential and commercial/industrial customers in Pacific Gas & Electric Company
(2020a). This metric is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.5. We do not consider
customers that fall into the customer-class “other” as defined by PG&E.
We refer to average electric power consumption per customer per hour in Kilowatts (kWs)
as '. For this analysis we use a value of 0.77 kW per customer per hour, which is provided
in Rockzsffore and Zafar (2015) as the average electricity usage for residential customers.
Because electric usage varies widely for commercial/industrial customers, we could not find
an average usage figure. Thus we assume all types of customers have the same consumption
rate and use our calculation as a lower-bound estimate.
We refer to cost per unserved kWh as  * . This is defined as the “cost for an outage event
normalized by the amount of unserved energy” (Sullivan et al. 2018). We use the online
Interruption Cost Estimate (ICE) Calculator, developed by Sullivan et al. (2018) to obtain
values for residential and commercial/industrial customers, which are $20.77 per kWh and
$47.01 per kWh for residential and commercial/industrial customers, respectively.
We combine these values to calculate the estimated cost of a PSPS event (Equation 4.5),
considering residential and customer/industrial customers separately.
 ∗ ' ∗  * = total cost (4.5)
4.3.2 Results
Using this method, we estimate the total cost for each event, shown in Table 4.1. The total
cost ranges from tens of millions of dollars for the smaller PSPS events to billions of dollars
for the larger PSPS events. These estimates are consistent with those reported in the media
(e.g., Reuters 2019; CNBC 2019; Wall Street Journal, The 2019).
Table 4.2 shows the average cost of a PSPS event to individual customers who experienced a
power outage. This cost varies by the total number of customers affected and the duration of
the outage. For example, the Oct. 26-Nov. 1 event, was the largest power shutoff in terms of
cost and it has the highest per customer cost for both residential and commercial/industrial
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Table 4.1. Estimated Cost of PSPS Events. The table shows the esti-
mated cost for each 2019 PSPS event, broken down by residential and cus-
tomer/industrial customers.
Event Residential ($) Commercial/Industrial ($) Total ($)
Jun. 8-9 5,137,623 13,786,296 18,923,919
Sep. 23-24 7,189,034 14,427,454 21,616,488
Sep. 25-26 11,519,963 26,990,202 38,510,165
Oct. 5-6 2,423,518 6,665,294 9,088,812
Oct. 9-12 487,446,183 1,339,121,713 1,826,567,896
Oct. 23-25 77,149,567 194,077,916 271,227,483
Oct. 26-Nov. 1 993,325,420 2,721,792,525 3,715,117,945
Nov. 20-21 18,621,660 53,640,822 72,262,482
customers. The per customer cost for each PSPS event can be interpreted as the dollar
amount a customer should be willing to pay to avoid the outage event (Wolfram 2019).
Table 4.2. Average PSPS Cost per Customer. The table shows the estimated
cost per customer for each 2019 PSPS event, broken down by each customer
type.
Cost ($) per Customer
Event Residential Commercial/Industrial
Jun. 8-9 261.52 5,385.27
Sep. 23-24 363.49 8,383.18
Sep. 25-26 263.49 5,412.11
Oct. 5-6 236.44 5,182.97
Oct. 9-12 752.63 17,159.43
Oct. 23-25 485.83 10,703.02
Oct. 26-Nov. 1 1,161.71 26,643.23
Nov. 20-21 438.64 9,916.96
Would a customer be willing to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars to avoid the impact
of a PSPS event? As a basis for comparison, we consider other relative costs that customers
typically face. Some PG&E customers may choose to invest in a generator; this would
allow a household (or business) to operate under normal conditions during a power shutoff.
However, the cost of an average household generator can range from hundreds to thousands
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of dollars. In practice, many customers choose to invest only in basic emergency supplies,
such as flashlights, batteries, and handheld generators, to mitigate the consequences of a
power outage. The cost of a PSPS event can also be compared to the cost of past wildfires
and wildfire suppression efforts. The wildfire known as the Camp Fire that occurred in
2018 is estimated to have cost between $1.4 billion to at least $2 billion (Feo et al. 2020).
Additionally, CAL FIRE has spent an estimated $2 billion per year since 2018 on wildfire
suppression efforts. Our total estimated cost for all 2019 PSPS events is approximately $5
billion (Feo et al. 2020).
4.4 Discussion
The three analyses in this chapter reveal several insights on the tensions in PSPS events.
Simple regression models can help us understand what future PSPS events may look
like. Choosing which circuits to de-energized in a region is largely determined by the
characteristics of the terrain around power lines. The proportion of line-miles in the HFTD
is an important factor in all three models we build.
Understanding and predicting the dynamics of wildfires caused by utility-ignitions is not a
simple task. It requires vast amount of detailed data. If PG&E is collecting this kind of data,
it is not publicly available.
Finally, PSPS events present enormous costs to customers, utility companies, and the state
as a whole. This cost can vary widely across power shutoff events.
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We conclude with a summary of contributions and results, as well as the potential for future
work.
5.1 Summary
This thesis performs three modeling and analysis tasks: (1) we conduct an extensive ex-
ploratory data analysis on the PG&E power grid, utility-caused ignitions, and past PSPS
events; (2) we develop models to gain insight on the PG&E decision process during PSPS
events; and (3) using power outage studies and economic models, we estimate the social
cost of PSPS events.
This thesis curates, integrates, and visualizes data from a wide variety of sources, including
PG&E, the CPUC, and the CAISO. This allows us to identify interactions between the
electric power grid, terrain, climate, and wildfire risk. We learn that ignition risk varies
widely across the power grid, and that utility-caused ignitions are common and have the
potential to grow into large fires. Additionally, PSPS events can vary largely in scope based
on duration, the number of customers affected, and the lost electric load. Much of the data
we use is part of a yearly effort put out by PG&E in their WMP; new data will be available
in 2021 that may supplement this analysis and provide more information on the state of the
power grid.
Furthermore, we develop simple regression models to determine important factors in
PG&E’s decision making-process when executing PSPS events. We observe the key drivers
to be whether or not a circuit crosses the HFTD (and what proportion of it is within this
area) and the PG&E risk score. We would benefit from having more complete and detailed
data for all assets in the power grid to conduct a more thorough analysis.
Finally, we translate concrete impact measures such as the duration, customers, and lost load
during a power shutoff into the overall social cost of PSPS events. We determine that for past
events, this value ranges from tens of millions to potentially billions of dollars. We estimate
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a lower bound for this cost that does not consider the varying electric demand of commercial
and/or industrial customers or customers PG&E classifies as “other” or “medical baseline.”
5.2 Conclusions
In this thesis we set out to answer three questions.
1. Under what conditions should the power be shut down?
2. Where should the power be shut down and for how long?
3. When and how should the power be restored?
We conclude the following with our various modeling and analysis tasks.
1. The primary driver for PSPS events is weather, and more specifically, high-speed
winds. These wind events create stress on structures within the power grid that result
in failures and ignition events.
2. The location and duration for a PSPS event depends on where critical weather event
occurs and how long it lasts. The conditions of electric utility assets also play a key
role—equipment that is aged, in need of vegetation maintenance, or in an area that
has high potential for fire spread has a higher likelihood of being de-energized during
a PSPS.
3. The restoration process begins to occur once wind speeds have fallen below a certain
threshold and is forecasted to continue decreasing. The duration of this process
largely depends on the total line miles that need to be patrolled, if the line miles can
be accessed aerially or via ground crews, and the failures/disruptions that need to be
addressed.
5.3 Future Work
The next phase in this research should consider a higher level of fidelity in modeling wild-
fires, the electric power grid, and the cost of power outages. This thesis takes a descriptive
and predictive approach, and building on this, future work should take on a prescriptive
approach. This would entail formulating an optimization problem that examines tradeoffs
in the timing, scope, and duration of PSPS events. As discussed in detail in Section 2.4, the
preliminary work of Rhodes et al. (2020) takes a first step at constructing an optimization
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model, but it is missing many of the details we have determined to be important in PSPS
modeling.
Additionally, PG&E’s decision-making process and risk analysis (and that of other util-
ity companies) is evolving as more PSPS events take place. They have ongoing efforts
to improve risk analysis, and they have partnered with academic institutions and other
commercial entities. One of these, Technosylva, “provides advanced GIS-enabled software
solutions for wildfire protection planning, operational response & firefighter and public
safety” (Technosylva 2020).
Finally, the results from analyses in this field have implications for Department of Defense
(DOD) operations. Somemilitary installations in theU.S. are exposed towildfire risk, and all
are vulnerable to power outages. The DOD would greatly benefit from better understanding
the interactions between wildfires and the electric power grid, as well as how to restore
power safely and efficiently.
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